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Increasing Uniformity and Capacity in

the Federal Appellate System
By TODD E. THOMPSON*
It has been twelve years since the Freund Committee' first ques-

tioned whether the increasingly heavy caseload of the United States
Supreme Court was beginning to interfere with the Court's effectiveness. In the interim, the volume of discussion has cyclically waxed and
waned, but no consensus has emerged on the extent or even the exist-

ence of the problem. Alarms sounded in the last two years, first by
Justices John Paul Stevens 2 and Byron White3 and then by Chief Justice Warren Burger,4 have once again brought national attention to the

topic.
One impression emerges quite clearly from the many studies, commentaries, and proposals that have accumulated in a dozen years of
debate: a major source of the Supreme Court's workload problem lies
in the structure of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. This
point is rarely made in such explicit terms, no doubt because it is so

obvious as to constitute a truism. Yet it has very important implications in the search for a solution, for it reminds us that the problems of
the two levels of appeal are inextricably linked. Any solution which
does not address the underlying problems created by that structure is

likely to be at best stop-gap and at worst unsuccessful.
* B.A., 1976, University of California, Santa Barbara; M.S., 1980, Cornell University;
J.D., 1983, University of California, Berkeley. The author gratefully acknowledges the considerable help of Paul J. Mishkin, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, .Berkeley. The work arose from a suggestion of Professor Mishkin and benefited
greatly from a constant flow of his ideas, criticism, and encouragement.
1. Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseloadof the Supreme
Cour, reprintedin 57 F.R.D. 573 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Freund Report].
2. Remarks by Justice Stevens, American Judicature Society Annual Banquet (Aug. 6,
1982) (available from the Public Information Office, United States Supreme Court) [hereinafter cited as Stevens Speech].
3. Speech by Justice White, Annual Meeting of the Antitrust Division of the American
Bar Ass'n (Aug. 10, 1982) (available from the Public Information Office, United States
Supreme Court) [hereinafter cited as White Speech].
4. Chief Justice Burger, Remarks at the Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Ass'n,
Annual Report on the State oftheludiciary(Feb. 6, 1983), reprintedin69 A.B.A. J. 442 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Burger Feb. 1983 Speech].
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The fundamental problem with the Courts of Appeals' structure is
the use of thirteen entirely independent appellate bodies to interpret
one ideally uniform body of federal law. The problems created by this
multitudinous structure were small at the time of its creation, for the
comparatively tiny caseload of the federal courts at the turn of the century permitted close supervision of the Courts of Appeals by the
Supreme Court. Because the sheer size of the modern federal docket at
all levels has made close supervision by a single nine member body
impossible, the inherent flaws in this structure have begun to emerge.
The most obvious result of the operation of many independent
courts, and the one that has attracted the attention of most commentators, is the inevitable emergence of conflicting decisions of law. Because the Supreme Court is the only court vested with the power to
resolve these conflicts, their presence automatically absorbs a substantial amount of the Court's limited time. A less remarked upon consequence of the existence of independent courts is that the final resolution
of any issue of law, absent action by the Supreme Court, requires that it
be litigated thirteen times in thirteen lower appellate courts. Of course,
when the smaller size of the federal docket permitted more comprehensive review by the Supreme Court, this was not a great problem. Any
issue that arose with any frequency could be quickly and finally resolved by the High Court, obviating the need for separate consideration
in the many circuits. In so doing, the Supreme Court was simply fulfilling the traditional supervisory role of the highest tier in an appellate
system. The appellate capacity of the modern Court, however, is too
small to permit review of more than a small portion of commonly
raised issues, leaving most to be resolved by repetitious and wasteful
litigation in the individual circuits.
A solution to what is commonly thought of as the "Supreme
Court's problem" must address the effects of this structural flaw if it is
to have any hope of long-term success. Restructuring the Supreme
Court to provide it with greater capacity will not accomplish this. The
resources of nine jurists are inadequate to the task. Rather, the role of
the Supreme Court must be redefined, and the lower courts must be
restructured to ease the burden imposed by the task of day-to-day supervision of the lower courts.
The primary aim of this Article is to elaborate upon these ideas
and to suggest ways of altering the current structure of the federal appellate system in order to accomodate the -insights they provide. A
complete understanding of both the ideas and the suggestions requires
the perspective provided by a knowledge of prior analyses and sugges-
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tions for solving the caseload problem. For that reason, a secondary
aim of the Article is to review and criticize existing proposals for easing
the Court's burden. To set these proposals in context, the Article begins with an analysis of the constraints on the ability of the federal
appellate system to cope with expanding caseloads. It then analyzes
the nature of the problem that the caseloads create. Next, the strengths
and weaknesses of existing proposals for solving the problem are reviewed and discussed, with particular attention paid to the well regarded proposal of the Chief Justice. Finally, the Article suggests two
alternative types of structural change which, while avoiding the pitfalls
of past proposals, will moderate the workload and increase the effectiveness of the Supreme Court by making the Courts of Appeals in
large part self-supervising.

I. Constraints on Responses to the Growth of Federal
Appellate Caseloads
Although the attention of the two major studies in the area, the
Freund Committee and the Hruska Commission,' focused primarily on

the problems of the Supreme Court, it is an undisputed fact that both
tiers of appellate review are suffering from increasingly heavy

caseloads. In the years from 1961 to 1981, filings in the Courts of Appeals increased from 4,204 6 to 26,362,' or from 54 to 200 cases per

judgeship per year.8 During the same period, filings in the Supreme
Court increased from 1,940 9 to 5,144 per year.' 0 Unlike the Courts of
5. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure andlnternalProcedures: .RecommendationsforChange,reprintedin67 F.R.D. 195 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hruska Report]. This Article will assume some familiarity with these seminal
reports. For a concise summary of their conclusions and the critical response to them see
Owens, The Hruska Commission's ProposedNational Court ofAppeals, 23 UCLA L. REv.
580 (1976).
6. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORTS ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES-ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR 144 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 REPORT].
7. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR 185 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 REPORT].

8. This distribution, calculated from the figures in 1981 REPORT, supranote 7, allows
for the expansion in the size of the circuit courts during that time from 78 to 132 full-time
judgeships. See 1961 REPORT, supra note 6, at 144 and 1981 REPORT, supra note 7, at 185.
9. 1961 REPORT, supranote 6, at 226-27.
10. 1981 REPORT, supranote 7, at 75. The filings during the October Term, 1982, which
were running at an average rate of 237 per week for the first seven weeks, were down slightly
from 1981's record pace of 248 per week. Greenhouse, Caseload Complaints are Up, But

Caseloadis Down, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1982, § 1 at B8, col. 3 (W. ed.). If this signals a
trend, the slight decease offers little comfort to the Justices. The Court granted review during the 1981 Term in 210 cases--twenty-six cases more than the previous Term, which was
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Appeals, the Supreme Court need not resolve all cases presented to it;
until recently, it has been able to regulate the impact of its expanding
docket by holding the number of cases granted plenary review constant
at about 150 per term." As a consequence, the Court has been giving
plenary consideration to an ever smaller portion of the questions of
national law presented to it.
The effect of the increasing caseloads is different in the Courts of
Appeals and the Supreme Court. Because the Supreme Court is limited to nine members, its ability to expand its capacity for work is severely limited. The Court's control over its plenary docket
theoretically gives it the means to keep its ultimate workload within
manageable limits: as the time required by the growing certiorari
docket expands, it could compensatorily shrink the plenary docket.
Unfortunately, this has obvious costs. Since the Court already declines
to address an ever larger portion of the cases presented to it, shrinking
the plenary docket would only aggravate an already disturbing trend.
At some point, the Justices would spend so much time sorting petitions
they would have no time left for hearing cases. Instead of further
shrinking the plenary docket, the Justices
have responded by adding
2
law clerks and working longer hours.'
The Courts of Appeals cannot so readily control the spigot. However, their appellate capacity can, in theory, be readily expanded by the
addition of new judges as needed to keep up with the burgeoning dockets. Unfortunately, there are significant practical restraints on the
Courts of Appeals' ability to expand. The most obvious is that expansion is not automatic, since the courts are dependent upon Congress to
create the necessary judgeships. Another restraint is that such expansion makes uniform application of federal law much more difficult. In
theory, federal law should be applied uniformly not only among but
also within the circuits. As an individual court expands, the likelihood
that conflicting interpretations of law will be propounded by separate
panels within the court increases for two reasons. First, it becomes
more difficult for individual judges to keep abreast of the recent decisions of their brethren. Second, the greater volume of cases and the
larger, presumably more diverse, court combine to increase the likelialready thirty cases larger than the Term before it-filling its 1982-1983 docket through
February before the Term had even begun. For further details of the federal courts' recent
caseloads see Levin, Adding Appellate Capacity to the FederalSystem: A NationalCourt of
Appeals or an Inter-CircuitTribunal, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 3-7 (1982).
11. See Justice White Speech, supra note 3, at 5.

12. Note, En Banc Review in FederalCircuit Courts: A Reassessment,72 MICH. L. REv.
1637 (1974).
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hood that panels representing different judicial philosophies will be
asked to decide similar questions of law and will reach different conclusions. Thus, intracircuit disharmony increases with size.
The traditional solution for such intracircuit conflict is an en banc
hearing to conclusively resolve the issue. Unfortunately, hearings en
banc are cumbersome and time-consuming events' 3 and become im-

practical as the courts grow larger. Two factors force a growing court
to spend an inordinate amount of time en banc. First, more conflicts
will be generated, thus requiring more hearings. Second, individual
hearings en banc will themselves become increasingly cumbersome as
more and more judges must be heard and accommodated. 4 Thus,

keeping intracircuit conflicts under control requires limiting court size.
Limiting court size while expanding the judiciary implies circuit
splitting. This is not a cost-free solution either. Besides diluting the
traditional federalizing function of the circuit courts,' 5 it assures even
more conflicts of legal interpretation between circuits. Since resolution
of intercircuit conflicts has traditionally been the Supreme Court's job,
circuit splitting will place pressure on that Court's already heavy

docket.
It is clear that there are limits to the capacity of the federal appellate courts as currently structured to expand to meet their caseloads.
The Supreme Court is limited by its size and, ultimately, by the

number of cases it can refuse to hear without impairing its current role
as a dispute settler and the final authority on important questions of
national law. The Courts of Appeals, in turn, are limited by the size of
individual courts and the number of circuits that can be maintained

without either intracircuit or intercircuit conflicts becoming
unmanageable.
13. See Remarks by Chief Justice Burger, 60th Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute 2 (May 17, 1983) (available from the Public Information Office, United States
Supreme Court) [hereinafter cited as Burger May 1983 Speech].
14. It was just this problem-too many intracircuit conflicts and too large a court to
resolve them readily-which led to the division of the old Fifth Circuit. Congress does
permit courts of appeals with over 15 active judges to adopt limited en banc procedures
involving less than the whole court. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1980). It was the Fifth Circuit's inability to settle on an acceptable limited en banc procedure which caused its members to unanimously request division--the first step toward the eventual splitting off of the Eleventh
Circuit. See Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Dec/s/s in the DividedFifth Circuit, 35 Sw.
L.J. 687, 702-04 (1981). An increase in intracircuit conflicts is not the only problem encountered by large courts. Administration can also be difficult. The Ninth Circuit has adopted
innovative procedures such as limited en banc and decentralized administration to stave off
division, but commentators disagree as to their success. See Granelli, 9th Circuit Rejects
Split: Wants Time to Experiment, NAT' L.J., Mar. 28, 1983, at 3, col. 2.
15. See Wisdom, Requiemfor a Great Court, 26 Loy. L. REv. 787, 788 (1980).
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II. Consequences of the Current Caseloads
It is simple to recommend additional circuit judgeships as a solution to the current caseload problem. In the past, however, strong
political resistance to expansion of the federal judiciary has made congressional approval difficult to obtain. Therefore, the Courts of Appeals have had to handle their increased burdens without whatever
relief this flexibility could provide. In 1978, the year before the dramatic expansion of the federal bench by the Omnibus Judgeship Act of
1978,16 annual case filings per circuit judgeship reached 195; 11 yet, despite this "dramatic" expansion, filings reached 200 per judgeship in
1981.18 A thirty-six per cent increase in the size of the circuit courts
was swallowed up in three years. By mid-1983, filings had reached 224
per judgeship per year. 19 It is widely agreed that if caseload growth has
not already impaired the courts' effectiveness it soon will.20 The percentage of cases disposed of after oral hearings declined from an average of forty-two per cent in the years 1971-1973 to an average of thirtytwo per cent in the years 1979-1981.21 The courts have been forced to
make increasing use of summary procedures to speed routine cases
through the system.22 It seems undisputed that reform of some type is
needed.
At least until recently there has been little unanimity concerning
16. Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629-34 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
17. 1981 REPORT, supra note 7, at 185. For details of calculation, see supra note 8.
18. Id.
19. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, FederalCourt Management Statistics 15 (1983).
20. See Feinberg, The National Court of Appeals, Is it Necessary, 32 REc. A.B. CITY
N.Y. 106 (1977); Friendly, Averting the Floodby Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REv.
634 (1974); Wisdom, supra note 15, at 791; J. HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 83 (1981).

21. Calculated from information supplied in 1981 REPORT, supra note 7, at 185, 192,
and in ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 50 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 REPORT].
22. For conflicting views on the desirability and effectiveness of these procedures, see
Carrington, Ceremony and Realism: The Demise ofAppellate Procedure,66 A.B.A. J. 860
(1980) and Godbold, Improvements in Appellate Procedure: Better Use ofAvailable Facilities,
A.B.A. J. 863 (1980).
In the Second Circuit, for example, 66% of the decisions are resolved by unpublished,
noncitable opinions, up from 47% in 1974. In 1978 and 1979, 55% of criminal and 63% of
civil appeals resulted in unpublished opinions nationally. Chambers, U.S. Appeals Court in
New York Restricts Lawyers' Use of Written Rulings, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1983, § 1, at 13,
col. I (W. ed.). Although this practice is said to be used primarily to dispose of frivolous
appeals, it has clear advantages as a means for speedy case disposition since unpublished
opinions need be neither as complete nor as well crafted as published ones and thus can be
written more quickly.
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the effects of the Supreme Court's caseload. Some commentators 23 and
former Justices24 have denied that the problem has grown serious
enough to require more than minimal reform. This is clearly a minority view among most commentators, study commissions, and the sitting
Justices. There is a growing consensus that even if the caseload burden
has not already created serious problems, it certainly will in the near
future. The increasing sense of urgency in the appeals of sitting Justices is perhaps most telling;25 that these conscientious individuals feel

they need help with their workload is a good indication that the
problems are indeed mounting. Congress, too, has taken note of the
23. See Feinberg,supra note 20, at 109; Friendly, supra note 20, at 635; Lay, Why Rush
to Judgment? Some Second Thoughts on the ProposedNationalCourt ofAppeals, 59 JUDICATURE 172, 175-79 (1975).

24. See Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 174-78 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Goldberg, One Supreme Court,NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1973, at 14-15; Warren,
RetiredChiefJusutceAttacks, ChiefJusticeBurgerDefends FreundStudy Group's Composition
andProposal,59 A.B.A. J. 721, 726-27 (1973).
Justice Brennan adhered to this view in Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S.
1014, 1032 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Recently, however, he took the position that the
Court might need help in resolving intercircuit conflicts. Remarks by Justice Brennan, Third
Circuit Judicial Conference 15-16 (Sept. 9, 1982) (available from the Public Information
Office, United States Supreme Court) [hereinafter cited as Brennan Speech].
25. Of the sitting Justices, only Justice Marshall has not acknowledged current
problems and called for some type of structural change in the federal appellate system. Justice Marshall opposes a new intercircuit tribunal and has stated that jurisdictional changes
would suffice. See 8 Second CircuitNewsletter 9 (Summer 1983); Hruska Report, supranote
5, at 403 (Letter of Justice Marshall). Justice Brennan recently acknowledged that reforms
are needed to take some pressure off the Court's caseload. See supranote 24. Justice White
has been most vocal in warning that the Court is failing in its mission because of inadequate
time. See Hruska Report, supra note 5, at 401 (Letter of Justice White); Brown Transp.
Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
White Speech, supra note 3, at 14-15. Justices Blackmun and Powell and the Chief Justice
have registered agreement with Justice White. See Brown Transp. Corp., 439 U.S. at 1025,
1029-30 (Opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by Blackmun, J.); Hruska Report, supra note 5, at
406-07 (Letter of Justice Powell). The Chief Justice has also expressed despair over the
severity of the problem. Remarks by Chief Justice Burger, Arthur T. Vanderbilt Dinner 910 (Nov. 18, 1982) (available from the Public Information Office, United States Supreme
Court); Greenhouse, BurgerProposesNew Panelto Cut High Court'sLoad,N.Y. Times, Feb.
7, 1983, §§ 4-6, at I, col. 7 (W. ed.); Burger Feb. 1983 Speech, supra note 4; Burger May 1983
Speech, supranote 13. Justice Rehnquist agrees that the Court is not fulfilling its duties and
has acknowledged the desirability of structural change. Hruska Report, supra note 5, at 40708. Justice Stevens has called for major change saying that the size of the Court's workload
has cut into the quality of its work. Stevens Speech, supra note 2, at 2, 11. Finally, Justice
O'Connor recently joined the others in calling for reform. Greenhouse, Burger Proposes
New Panelto Cut High Court'sLoad, N.Y Times, Feb. 7, 1983, § 1, at 1, II, col. 6 (W. ed.);
Remarks by Justice O'Connor at the Joint Meeting of the Fellows of the American Bar
Foundation and the National Conference of Bar Presidents I I (Feb. 6, 1983) (available from
the Public Information Office, United States Supreme Court).
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problem. z6
The discussion should not be diverted by debate about whether the
problem is presently critical. As the analysis below demonstrates,
steady deterioration of the quality of review and guidance provided by
the Supreme Court is an inevitable result of the existing appellate court
structure. Because of the incremental nature of the deterioration, individual commentators will always.disagree about the time at which major reform becomes necessary. Regardless, it is important to realize
that without structural change the Court's ability to carry out its traditional role in the federal system will be frustrated further. This does
not result from time pressures per se but rather from the growth of the
appellate caseload, which demands more from the Supreme Court than
nine individuals can possibly perform. As time goes on, the volume of
labor demanded will only increase; the Justices' capacity will not.
The Court's overload is likely to manifest itself in three ways.
First, the quality of its decisionmaking will decline. As time pressures
increase, cases are more likely to be hastily decided, and the resulting
opinions will be lesscoherent and carefully reasoned. It was this result
Henry M. Hart, Jr. feared when he noted several years ago that the
expanding certiorari docket was likely to leave too little time for the
careful reflection which proper adjudication requires. 27 This idea was
amplified in the Freund Committee report. The Committee's solution
was to remove the task of screening certiorari petitions from the
Supreme Court and give it to a newly created National Court of Appeals. The storm of criticism leveled at the Committee's implicit assumption that screening certiorari petitions is work of secondary
importance buried the legitimacy of the Committee's concerns: that
having too much to do in too little time leads to shoddy work.
Although it is difficult to compare objectively the quality of the current
Court's work to that of earlier, less busy Courts, some signs of stress
can be detected. The increasing length of modern opinions, which has
26. During the 1982 legislative session, three bills were introduced which would make
major structural changes in the federal appellate system in order to lighten the Supreme
Court's load. S. 1529,97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. Rac. S8748 (daily ed. July 29, 1981)
(reintroduced Feb. 2, 1983 as S. 382, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 CoNG. REC. S889 (daily ed.
Feb. 2, 1983); S. 2035, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S222-25 (daily ed. Jan. 29,
1982); H.R. 4762, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. RIc. H7427 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1981). A
fourth bill, similar to H.R. 4762, was introduced into the Senate in 1983 as S. 645, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S1947 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983).
27. Hart, The Time Chartofthe Justices,73 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959). See also Remarks
of Lewis F. Powell, Jr. at the Eleventh Circuit Conference 2 (May 8-10, 1983) (available
from the Public Information Office, United States Supreme Court) [hereinafter cited as Powell 1983 Speech].
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been attributed to the increasing complexity of problems confronting
the Court, too much participation by law review trained clerks, and
innate verbosity,

8

could as easily be caused by lack of time. As every

writer knows, the process of editing to achieve concise expression is
time consuming. Similarly, the proliferation of separate opinions, 29
easily ascribed to a fractious and ideological court, could also be due to
the limited time available for negotiation and accommodation. The
process of compromise necessary to arrive at a majority opinion satisfactory to all in a difficult case is time consuming.30 As Justice Stevens
commented, the Court is so busy deciding cases that it has not even had
time to confer about whether it needs help in doing so. 3
The second and third manifestations of the Court's overload problem formed the core of the Hruska Commission's critique. The Commission concluded that the nation was suffering from a lack of
adequate national appellate capacity-in other words, that the
Supreme Court does not have enough time to decide enough cases to
perform adequately its role in the judicial system.32 The Court has two
essential duties: 1) to insure uniform application of national law by
resolving conflicting interpretations among state and lower federal
courts, and 2) to provide guidance in the interpretation of national law
28. Little, The Workload of the Supreme Court- Ruling the Pen with the Tongue, 6 J.
LEGAL PROF. 51, 58, 68-69 (1981).
29. Id at 56-57.
30. The descriptions which do exist of the process of Supreme Court decisionmaking
suggest that time consuming negotiations, drafting, and redrafting are necessary to resolve
the conflicts of law that often prevent unanimity. The differing positions are often not as
irreconcilable as they appear when presented in separate opinions-if the time and will are
sufficient to achieve compromise. See, e.g., G. DtNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL
REVOLUTION 318-24 (1977) (description of the making of Brown II, a case decided unanimously after a six month incubation despite the sensitive ideological issues involved). See
generallyB. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN, INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
(1979).
Although The Brethren-assumingthe picture it presents to be accurate-indicates that
the Justices do very little talking and negotiating and therefore more time would make little
difference in the Court's decisions, the Terms covered by he Brethren represent the beginning of the modem crushing caseloads. It is not necessarily representative of the interchambers relationships which would exist in a less pressured atmosphere. Less pressure
might indeed change the isolation in which the Justices reportedly work, since it would
provide more time for relaxed discussion, compromise, and draft circulation.
31. Stevens Speech, supranote 2, at 4. Justice Stevens also pointed out other symptoms
of decline in the quality of the Court's work product: delay in oral hearings, more cases
disposed of on the merits without full briefing and argument, more per curiam opinions
written by staff members, more dismissals of certiorari writs as improvidently granted, and
an increasing delegation of work to law clerks. Id at 2-4.
32. Hruska Report, supra note 5, at 211.
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by deciding issues of overriding national importance. 33 Overload is
thus likely to cause a twofold failure: inadequate resolution of conflicts
among courts and too few decisions of national law to guide adequately
the interpretation of national law.
A. Resolving Conflicts of Law
The first of these failings is the most easily measured and, perhaps
for that reason, has attracted the most attention. As recently as the
1950's, the Supreme Court was expected to grant certiorari in all cases
presenting a conflict of interpretation of federal law; the failure to grant
certiorari in such cases attracted attention.3 4 Time pressures have eliminated this comprehensiveness. The Hruska Commission, in a study of
2,254 paid certiorari petitions denied review during the 1971 and 1972
Terms, found sixty-one different reviewable direct conflicts which the
Court declined to resolve. 35 In addition, the Court denied review to
petitions presenting seventy "strong partial" and ninety "weak partial"
conflicts.3 6 If these proportions are applied to the caseload for the 1980
Term,37the Court would have ignored approximately seventy direct conflicts.
By the same reasoning, fifty-four "strong partial" conflicts were
33. The Court recognizes these duties in its Rules, which list the following grounds for
review on certiorari: conflict between state and/or federal courts, the existence of "an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court,"
and egregious error by a federal court. Sup. CT. R. 17.1.
34. As recently as 1951, a leading treatise on the Supreme Court claimed that the Court
granted certiorari to resolve conflicts as a matter of course regardless of the importance of
the question presented. R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 629 (Wolfson & Kurland ed. 1951). Even at that time this
could have been a myth; a study of the Court's certiorari docket found that from 1958-1960
conflicts were denied review almost as frequently as during the period of the Hruska Report's study 12 years later. G. CASPER & R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME
COURT 88 (1976). Nevertheless, it came as an apparent surprise to commentators in 1953 to
realize that the Court did not review every case presenting a conflict. Stem, Denialof CertiorariDespite a Conflict, 66 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1953). Some felt compelled to explain away
the denials of review as involving cases with only ephemeral conflicts. Roehner & Roehner,
Certiorari-Whatis a Conflict Between Circuits?, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 656 (1953).
35. Hruska Report, supranote 5, at 318.
36. Id. at 310. These petitions were not analyzed to discover duplications, conflicts resolved by the Court in other cases during the Term, or procedural problems. Therefore they
overstate to some extent the number of distinct, reviewable partial conflicts. If the number
of partial conflict cases is reduced to account for duplications and nonreviewable cases, the
numbers become 47 "solid" strong partial conflicts and 61 "solid" weak partial conflicts.
37. At a rate of 61 direct conflicts per 2,254 paid petitions, 70 direct conflicts in the
approximately 2,600 paid petitions filed in the 1980-1981 Term were denied review. 1981
REPORT, supra note 7, at 345.
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also passed over.3 8 Together, at 124, these cases would nearly fill the
plenary docket of the Court. The limited statistical information available39 suggests that the Court leaves unresolved a substantial number
of conflicts. 4 ° This would have been unthinkable thirty years ago.
That we are now willing to accept it demonstrates how the Court's inability to keep up has changed our perception of "adequate"
performance.
Some commentators, however, dispute either the existence or importance of unresolved conflicts. 4 ' Justice Stevens, for example, has
said that conflicts in the interpretation of federal law are "not always
an intolerable evil" because they illuminate issues prior to a final resolution. 42 Judge J. Clifford Wallace of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has presented the most comprehensive analysis of the conflicts
38. The figure was arrived at by applying the rate of distinct "strong partial" conflicts
found in Hruska Report, see supranote 36, to the data on paid petitions from 1981 REPORT,
see supra note 37, at 345.
39. In a dissent from denial of certiorari in 1978, Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, listed a selection of nine such conflicts denied review by the Court from among 365
paid petitions which were denied review. Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014,
1016-19 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Including the case which is
the subject of the dissent, these 10 cases out of 365 represent 2.7%. Remarkably, this is
identical to the percentage found by the Hruska Commission. Hruska Report, supranote 5,
at 318.
Casper and Posner also studied conflicts that were denied review. G. CASPER & R.
POSNER, supra note 34, at 87-91. Interestingly, they found that the Court was denying review to conflict cases as early as 1958, demonstrating that this problem is not a new one and
cannot be attributed solely to the heavy caseloads of the 1970's. Their data indicated fewer
cases were denied review than the data used by the Hruska Report and Justice White. However, the Casper and Posner data may be unreliable. They used a method of ascertaining
conflicts that "underestimate[d] the number of genuine conflict cases," id. at 90, and a much
smaller sample size, Id at 88. Therefore, their figures are of more use in outlining a trend
than in determining the number of conflicts denied review. Id at 90.
40. It must also be remembered that the numbers cited do not include those potential
petitioners who, discouraged by the Court's low acceptance rate, decide to forgo the expense
and trouble of petitioning. The actual number of conflicts left standing could thus be even
higher. See Hruska Report, supra note 5, at 211.
41. See, e.g., J. HOWARD, supranote 20, at 81; Alsup, Reservationson the Proposalofthe
Hruska Commission to Establish a National Court ofAppeals, U. TOL. L. REv. 431, 435-38
(1976); Cutler, The NationalCourt ofAppeals, Is It Necessary, 32 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. I l1,
112 (1977); Feinberg, supranote 20, at 109; Lay, supra note 23, at 175; Wallace, The Nature
and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Neededfor a Mountain or a Molehll?, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 913 (1983); Stevens Speech, supra note 2, at 13-14.
42. Stevens Speech, supra note 2, at 13. Suggesting that conflicts illuminate issues
before final resolution assumes that there will be a final resolution. The Hruska Commission's study found that of 66 unduplicated conflicts, 52 were not subsequently resolved by
the Court during the Term of the study. Hruska Report, supra note 5, at 314 (Table 16) &
315 (Table 19).
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problem.43 As he correctly points out, no research has examined the
importance of the unresolved conflicts: particularly 1) whether intercircuit conflicts are intrinsically bad; 2) whether conflicts in some areas of
the law are less acceptable than others; and 3) how many unacceptable
conflicts actually exist.44 Moreover, conflicts may have advantages.
They represent the development of the law. Disagreements are to be
expected; and they form the basis, as Justice Stevens pointed out, for a
wise final resolution.45 Judge Wallace also argues that
regional varia46
bility and local needs might support such Conflicts.
The first point is clearly correct. Wise final resolution of issues is
undoubtedly enhanced by the opportunity to compare the reasoning
behind conflicting circuit court opinions and observing the subsequent
practical results of the decisions. The second point, that varying local
needs might support conflicts, is debatable. First, it is unlikely that federal law can be responsive to "local needs" when applied at the circuit
level. For example, it is likely that there are far greater differences between the needs of rural California and Los Angeles than between Los
Angeles and Dallas, yet only the latter differences can be addressed by
intercircuit conflict. Therefore, intercircuit conflicts can only serve a
very limited set of local-more specifically, regional-needs. Second, a
major premise underlying Judge Wallace's assertion is that it is proper
or even desirable for the meaning of federal and constitutional law to
vary regionally. Yet it is the essence of federal law that it be applied
and enforced uniformly throughout the nation. Even Justice Stevens,
who refers to conflicts as a tolerable "evil," implicitly recognizes that
the ideal is uniformity. To accept Judge Wallace's analysis would demand a radical rethinking of the traditional concept of "federal" law.
Nevertheless, these advantages indicate that temporary conflict is
desirable because it permits exploration for the most effective interpretation of federal law. However, when weighed against the substantial
disadvantages of conflicts-the sense of injustice caused by different
interpretations of ideally uniform federal law, the advantage given to
litigants able to forum shop, and the uncertainty and unpredictability
engendered in circuits which have not yet ruled on the issues 47-it is
43. See Wallace, supra note 41.
44. Id at 928-29.
45. See Stevens Speech, supra note 2, at 13. See also Judge Wallace's extensive discussion, supra note 41, at 929-30.
46. Wallace, supra note 41, at 930.
47. Judge Wallace insists that the major negative impact of intercircuit conflicts is on
"multi-circuit actors," Id at 931, such as corporations and the federal government.
Although hardly insignificant alone, this is not the only negative impact of intercircuit con-
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apparent that persistent conflicts will rarely be advantageous. After a
few circuits have had some time to explore an issue, the costs of conflict
will soon outweigh the marginal value of further experimentation.
Since four federal judges must examine an issue before it is passed on
by a single court of appeals, it is unlikely that examination by three or
more courts will discover subtleties missed by the first two. Conversely,
the inherently unfair nature of conflicts-which undercut the "federalizing" 48 function of federal law while promoting uncertainty and forum
shopping--only intensifies with time. Therefore, the optimal time for
issues to remain unresolved is likely to be short.
B.

Providing Guidance in the Interpretation of Federal Law

Most scholarly commentary has centered on the problems of in-

tercircuit conflicts in analyzing problems arising from the Court's
caseload, but conflicts are only one subset of a second problem generated by inadequate national appellate capacity: the general problem of
unresolved issues. Two of the problems generated by conflicts--oppor-

tunities for forum shopping and uncertainty in circuits that have not
yet ruled on an issue 4 9-are not restricted to cases featuring a realized

conflict. They arise any time an issue of federal law has not been settled either by a ruling in each of the thirteen circuits" ° or by authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement. In other words, they arise
whenever there is a potentialfor conflict.

Until the Supreme Court acts, multicircuit actors can "shop" for a
forum in which the issue has not been settled in an attempt to generate

a favorable ruling. This advantage exists regardless of whether a conflict has yet arisen. Similarly, in each of these undecided circuits planning is made difficult by the lack of an authoritative ruling. Even if a
conflict has not yet arisen, the possibility of such a conflict in an unde-

cided circuit creates uncertainty.5" A corollary of these problems is that
flicts. Conflicts run against the grain of federal law and weaken respect for it as a nationally
uniform system. Even Judge Wallace posits uniformity in an "ideal" world. Id at 923.
More importantly, conflicts make reliable planning impossible in those circuits which have
not settled an issue of law. A conflict between two circuits threatens legal planning in all.
Further, by pointing out the difficulty of an issue, conflicts encourage, rather than suppress,
litigation in undecided circuits. In this respect conflicts are no different from any other
nationally unresolved issues.
48. Wisdom, supra note 15, at 788.
49. Wallace, supra note 41, at 930.
50. The same problem arises, of course, when federal issues arise in the 50 state court
jurisdictions.
51. That an issue has been previously decided without conflict in two or more circuits
might seem to lend some certainty to its ultimate resolution in other circuits. To the extent

470

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 11:457

unresolved issues increase the quantity of appellate litigation, since as
long as an issue is unresolved, it is likely to be pressed by litigants.
Until the issue is settled in a circuit it must be addressed fully by each
district judge who confronts it; until it is settled nationally, it must also
be addressed by each of thirteen three-judge circuit court panels. When
a conflict develops during this process it adds to the problem only because it creates an extra sense of injustice or institutional malfunction,
not because it creates significantly more uncertainty.52 The primary
problems of forum shopping, uncertainty, and the consequent expansion of litigation accompany unresolved issues regardless of whether
they have yet produced a conflict.
One of the Supreme Court's roles is to address and resolve such
issues nationally. Plainly it has no time to address all issues which arise
in more than one circuit, nor is this necessary. Instead, by deciding a
few cases ineach area of law the Court provides a framework which
guides the lower courts in resolving finer issues. By carefully choosing
and deciding a sufficient number of these cases, the Court can provide
enough guidance to minimize possible disagreement among circuit
courts. If, however, the cases are not carefully chosen or decided, or if
the Court simply has too little time to select and decide enough cases to
build a framework, the lower courts will be left to their own devices.
Their range of choice on issues will be much larger, aggravating the
uncertainty in unsettled circuits. The Supreme Court's role-minimizing the adverse effects of unresolved issues-is obviously crucial.
Proper performance of this role would be a major step towards neutralizing the uncertainty inherent in our thirteen circuit system.
The Court's increasing caseload burden can affect its performance
of this role in two ways. First, the Court must carefully select and dethat the unanimity demonstrates that most circuit judges are likely to view the issue one
way, this is true. However, existing precedents do not appear to influence decisions directly
in an unsettled circuit. In a survey ofjudges of the Second, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits, only 6
of 35 judges found prior decisions of another circuit to be "very important" to their resolution of an issue when precedent in their own circuit was lacking. By contrast, 26 of 35 found
the "dictates of justice" very important. J. HOWARD, supra note 20, at 165. The message to
litigants is that circuit judges follow their own instincts; behavior of other judges in other
circuits is only a limited guide to the behavior of their undecided brethren. As Judge Robinson noted, "[tihe notion that any [federal judge] would defer on stare decisis grounds to a
decision by a co-ordinate court with which he disagreed is unworthy of comment." Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209,
1217 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'dsub nom GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer's Union of the United
States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375 (1980).
52. Conflicts bring an unresolved issue to the attention of litigators and the Supreme
Court. This, perhaps, accounts for the extra attention they have received from
commentators.

Spring 1984]

INCREASING UNIFORMITY AND CAPACITY

cide cases in each area of the law. 3 To the extent that the Court's
increased caseload diminishes the attention given to choosing cases and

writing majority opinions,54 the Court's guidance is undercut. Not only
may the Court's caseload play a role in the recent increase in separate
opinions, but it may also be 55responsible for carelessness on the part of
the Court in selecting cases.

Second, all other things being equal, the fewer cases decided in
any specific area of law, the less guidance will be provided. Although it
is difficult to determine the impact of the caseload on the quality of
guidance given by the cases the Court does decide, objective data is
available on the quantity of cases decided.
As has been widely noted, the modem Supreme Court is a constitutional and civil rights court. In his study of the Court's plenary

docket during the 1971-1976 Terms, Professor Hellman found that
fifty-three per cent of the plenary decisions addressed issues of civil
rights law, 56 up from twenty-seven per cent during the 1959 Term and
thirty-eight per cent during the 1963-1965 Terms.5 7 As the Court's guidance in this area of the law has intensified, its supervision of the grow-

ing body of federal statutory law has fallen. During the 1959 to 1967
Terms, the Court decided an average of fifty-one cases of federal statutory law; this has declined to a level of about forty-three cases per Term
more recently. Although this does not appear to be a dramatic de-

cline, when viewed in light of the increasing quantity of federal appellate business it is significant. The fifty-two statutory cases decided in

1967 provided guidance for the statutory law questions contained in
53. Two noted commentators, Dean Erwin Griswold and Professor Philip Kurland,
have attacked the Court's performance of this function. Dean Griswold accused the Court
of failing to choose its cases in a predictable manner and criticized the Court for a lack of
consistency in its decisions; in his view this stimulates appeals and creates additional litigation. Professor Kurland also accused the Court of poor case selection and inconsistency in
decisionmaking. See Winter, Its Own Fault, Critiquingthe Supreme Court,69 A.B.A. J. 424
(1983). There is, of course, more than one possible explanation for this failure. Increased
workload pressure cuts the quality of the Court's guidance to the extent that it contributes to
the problem of poor case selection.
54. Separate opinions can create special difficulties in this area by clouding the grounds
for decision and confusing the proper factors to be taken into account by lower courts in
deciding similar issues.
55. Justice Stevens placed the blame for carelessness in selecting cases upon the Court's
caseload. Stevens Speech, supranote 2, at 2-4; see also Mann, The High Court. Not Infallible and Not Final,AM. LAW., Feb. 1983, at 53.
56. Hellman, The Business ofthe Supreme Court Under the JudiciaryAct of 1925: The
PlenaryDocket in the 1970s, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1745 (1978).
57. Id at 1746.
58. Id at 1776-77. The low points found by Hellman were 36, 37, and 36 cases during
the 1968-1970 Terms, respectively, and 32 during the 1976 Term. Id at 1778-79.
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7,903 cases filed in the courts of appeals that year; assuming that the
same proportion of statutory cases were filed in the courts of appeals in
1980, the forty-three statutory cases decided in 1980 provided guidance
for statutory law issues contained in 23,200 court of appeals cases. 9
Seventeen per cent fewer decisions guided 294% more appeals.
In a detailed examination, Professor Hellman found that the decline was not evenly distributed.6" The Court has decreased its supervision of many older areas of law that are presumably more settled and
turned its attention to newer areas.6

in

tax,62

admiralty,63

1

The greatest declines have come

federal worker's compensation laws,

4

review of

National Labor Relations Board orders and enforcement of collective

bargaining agreements, 65 review of Interstate Commerce Commission
orders, 66 and immigration law. 67 Some of these can be readily explained and are unlikely to have resulted in less effective guidance.
The increased review in admiralty and the law of collective bargaining
agreements at the beginning of the study period, 1959-1964, coincided
with the Supreme Court's formulation of new law in those areas.68
Once these basic frameworks were created, the Court decreased its activity.69 In other areas, however, the reasons for the decline are not so

obvious. In several, the Court now restricts its activity primarily to set-

tling conflicts.70 This is the case in tax,7 1 immigration,72 substantive

59. The caseload figures are from 1981 REPORT, supranote 7, at 185. It is likely that the
number of statutory law cases has remained steady in the Supreme Court. Professor
Hellman found it to be steady during the first half of the 1970's, and the size of the plenary
docket also remained stable throughout the decade. See Hellman, The Supreme Court and
StatutoryLaw: The PlenaryDocket in the 1970"s, 40 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1,6 (1978). Of course,
the figures will not be quite comparable if the proportion of statutory law appeals has declined since 1967 in the courts of appeals.
60. Hellman, supra note 59, at 3-5.
61. Hellman, supra note 56, at 1780.
62. Hellman, supra note 59, at 20-21.
63. Id at 32.
64. Id at 18, 31.
65. I d at 15-17.
66. Id at 11-12.
67. Id at 23-24.
68. Id at 16-17, 32. For another example of a concentrated series of decisions effecting
a major change in the direction of federal law, see the description of the Court's expansion
of liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act described in Thomas v. Grigorescu,
582 F. Supp. 514, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
69. The decline in interstate commerce cases is also readily explained. At the beginning
of the study period the Court was the only tier of appellate court review over three-judge
panels. Now appeals are routed to the circuit courts first, and the Court has naturally been
content to let them handle the bulk of the appeals. Hellman, supra note 59, at 12.
70. Hellman, supranote 56, at 1781.
71. Hellman, supra note 59, at 21.
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criminal law, 3 the Federal Tort Claims Act, 74 and bankruptcy. 71 Presumably, the Court is not providing guidance in these areas as much as
it is settling disputes; initial substantive formulation of law is left to the
courts of appeals.
A distinct pattern emerges from these observations. The Court
tends to intervene heavily in new areas of law in order to build a
framework for analysis-most recently regarding the Freedom of Information Act,7 6 employment discrimination,7 7 environmental law,7 8

and civil rights law 79 -and in older areas of law which it wants to

change significantly. In the remaining areas of law the Court limits its
intervention primarily to conflict resolution. As a result, some areas
seem to get slighted; 80 and a few areas, for example antitrust law and
NLRB rulings, are given more active supervision, albeit to a lesser extent than in the 1960's.
This pattern does not necessarily lead to high levels of unresolved
issues or result from an excessive caseload." It does demonstrate, however, how little guidance the Court is able to give in many large and
important areas of law. Despite the increase in the number of federal
statutes, the Court devotes less total attention to them. Further, be-

cause it does not choose its cases primarily to create a guiding deci72. Id at 23-24.
73. Id at 28.
74. Id at 29.
75. Id at 30.
76. Id at 24-25.
77. Id at 18.
78. id at 25.
79. Id at 30.
80. In many areas of frequent lower court litigation, the Supreme Court has handed
down comparatively few decisions. Hellman, su~pranote 56, at 1782-83. Professor Hellman
refers particularly to the dearth of Supreme Court cases brought under the Miller Act, which
protects suppliers on government projects, and the Truth in Lending Act. He also contends
that few Supreme Court cases have dealt with the following areas of law: black lung disability, admiralty, bankruptcy, patent, copyright, and trademark law. Supervision of several
government agencies, measured by the number of decisions reviewing their rulings, has also
declined since the 1960's. These agencies include the Federal Trade Commission, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Maritime Commission, and the Securities
Exchange Commission. Id at 1783, n.266.
81. CASPER & POSNER, supra note 34, at 30, 51-53, point out that the lower level of
supervision may result from a decreased need for guidance in these areas because of decline
in the activities regulated, the absence of change in the regulating statutes, and the accumulation of precedents. This possibility cannot be ignored; to the extent it is true, it will mitigate the otherwise harmful effects of the Court's withdrawal in these areas. It is difficult to
believe, however, that the recent increases in appeals to the courts of appeals occurred despite stagnation in the underlying law or that they do not raise any fresh and knotty issues.
That the statutes do not change does not stop the social context in which they must be
applied from changing, thus decreasing the applicability of past precedents.
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sional framework but rather to resolve conflicts, those cases the Court
does decide are unlikely to provide much guidance to lower courts in
the treatment of other issues arising in the future. The Court now
seems to follow rather than lead the initiative of the lower courts. Litigants will therefore find it more difficult to predict the ultimate outcome of a question unresolved in their circuit because there will be less
higher authority to guide and control it.

III. Existing Proposals for Easing the Supreme Court's
Workload
Proposals for restructuring the federal appellate system to ease the
burden on the Supreme Court and provide greater appellate capacity
have generated much controversy in recent years. Three distinct proposals have been given serious or widespread attention-a National
Court of Appeals as first formulated by the Freund Committee 82 and
later by the Hruska Commission,8 3 and the National En Banc schemes
recently proposed by Judge Wallace8 4 and the Chief Justice.85 The first
two proposals have been criticized thoroughly and now seem to have
been discredited as desirable solutions to the problem. Nevertheless,
their virtues and failings may serve as helpful guideposts in formulating a more acceptable solution. The third proposal, a National En
Banc Court, has yet to be carefully analyzed. Therefore, its general outlines will be described and its short- and long-term implications explored. Finally, an original fourth proposal will be introduced.
A.

The Freund Committee and Hruska Commission Proposals

The Freund Committee and Hruska Commission proposals each
contained a feature which commentators found particularly objectionable. These "fatal flaws" doomed each groups' specific suggestions, but.
the core of both proposals-a new National Court of Appeals which
would act like a junior Supreme Court, hearing cases referred to it by
the High Court and rendering nationally binding decisions-remains
the basis of more recent proposals as well as both bills pending in the
Senate.8 6 It is therefore important to review the weaknesses of both
82. Freund Report, supranote 1.
83. Hruska Report, supra note 5.
84. Wallace, supra note 41.
85. See Greenhouse, supra note 25; Burger Feb. 1983 Speech, supra note 4.
86. See, e.g., the proposals in Levin, supra note 10, and, in part, Cutler, Helpfor High
Court, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1982, § 1, at 23, col. 2 (W. ed.). Both bills before the Senate
which purport to be solutions to the Court's caseload problem propose creation of such a
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early proposals.
The Freund Committee proposed to lighten the Court's load by
delegating the task of initially screening certiorari petitions to a sevenmember National Court of Appeals. This court could either deny review or pass petitions on to the Supreme Court. The High Court could
then deny the petitions, grant review itself, or remand for plenary review by the National Court. 7
As an additional forum for rendering nationally binding decisions,
this court plainly would have had the salutory effect of nearly doubling
national appellate capacity. However, its fatal flaw, which attracted
harsh criticism, was the suggestion that initial certiorari petitions be
screened by the National Court. First, it was pointed out that the National Court would save the Supreme Court little time because winnowing out the three or four hundred meritorious petitions takes far
less of the Justices' time than deciding which of those to actually review."8 Second, screening petitions was said to be an integral part of
the Supreme Court's role in guiding the development of national law. 9
Finally, critics declared that universal access to the Supreme Court is a
cherished aspect of our legal system not to be denied lightly.90 These
factors caused most commentators to declare that petition screening
was not properly delegable. In retrospect, it seems that the threat to the
Court's independence and prerogatives posed by such a National Court
was exaggerated since the judges of the new court, as responsible jurists, would undoubtedly screen out only the most undeserving petitions and would pass on any of merit. Nevertheless, the suggestion that
a new National Court should assume petition screening duties has been
resoundingly rejected. 91
court. See S. 382, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S892-93 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1983)
and S. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. Rnc. S1947 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983).
87. Freund Report, supra note I, at 590-95.
88. Owens, supra note 5, at 585.
89. As Justice Brennan pointed out, screening petitions not only permits the Court maximum flexibility in choosing its cases, but it also promotes exchange of ideas among the
Justices at conferences, provides an outlet for developing judicial views through dissents to
the denial of certiorari, and keeps the Justices appraised of changes in American law. Brennan Speech, supra note 24, at 11-14.
90. Haworth, CircuitSplittingand the "New" NationalCourt ofAppeals: Can the Mouse
Roar:4 30 Sw. L.J. 839, 857 (1976).
91. Justice Stevens recently resuscitated the Freund Committee's idea in modified form.
He would give the National Court complete control over the disposition of certiorari petitions, with the Supreme Court reviewing whatever was passed up to it. Stevens' Speech,
supra note 2, at 11. Not surprisingly, this prescription is a cure for more than an excessive
workload. Justice Stevens feels that the Court engages in excessive lawmaking by granting
certiorari too early in the course of litigation, by accepting cases not on the basis of intrinsic
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The Hruska Commission jettisoned the idea of delegating the task
of screening certiorari petitions to the National Court and redefined the
new court's proper role: solely to hear cases. The proposed Hruska
court would have heard two types of cases: those referred to it by the
Supreme Court, which could either command the National Court to
review the case or leave review to the lower court's discretion, and
those "transferred" to the National Court by the Circuit Courts of Ap-

peals. The Commission envisioned as candidates for transfer those
cases containing issues about which federal courts disagreed and that

contained recurring fact patterns, or cases that concerned rules of law
previously announced by the National Court. 92 The National Court
could accept or deny transfer at its discretion.
The objectionable aspect of this proposal was transfer jurisdiction.
It was attacked for taking control over the timing and manner of presentation of the resolution of national issues away from the Supreme
Court.93 Commentators reasoned that issues which induced transfer
would be of particular national importance, and the Supreme Court
would feel pressured to review them immediately regardless of whether
it thought they had had adequate time for "percolation" in the circuit
courts.9 4 Transfer jurisdiction was also accused of encouraging forum

shopping, since multicircuit litigants would, upon discovering which
circuits were more prone to transfer troublesome cases, be able to plan
their litigation accordingly. 95 As was the case with petition screening,
the problems that transfer jurisdiction would allegedly create were ex-

aggerated. Those cases suitable for transfer would not necessarily be of
overriding national importance. Often they would involve issues that
arose frequently but were otherwise unexceptional. It is also unlikely
importance but solely to correct error, and by using cases as a departure point for announcing doctrines not required for their resolution. Id at 7-9. By separating the process of grant-.
ing certiorari from actual review, Justice Stevens hopes to reduce the opportunity for this
excessive lawmaking.
The objections leveled at the Freund Committee proposal apply with increased force to
Justice Stevens' idea since it would deny access to the Court altogether. It would seem that
the cure for his major complaint- excessive lawmaking--should lie not in structural change
but in a change in the attitudes of his fellow Justices. Structural change should be reserved
for those problems which cannot be cured through other means, such as workload burdens.
As will be shown, there are effective ways of easing the workload which do not require
drastically changing the traditional functions of the Court. Given the Justices' inevitable
human weaknesses, however, Justice Stevens' proposal for structural change may be the
only way to cure the problem with which he is concerned.
92. Hruska Report, supranote 5, at 241-42.
93. Owens, supra note 5, at 607-08.
94. Lay, supra note 23, at 177; Alsup, supra note 41, at 446.
95. Owens, supra note 5, at 604.
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that major differences in transfer policy would arise among circuits.
Nevertheless, few voices are now raised in defense of transfer
jurisdiction.9 6
Critics did not restrict their scrutiny to those characteristics of a
national court deemed most objectionable. They also discussed the

problems that will occur with any new national court, particularly one
that operates as an adjunct 97 to the Supreme Court by hearing cases on
referral. Because, as noted above, this type of court is retained in sev-

eral present proposals, these observations remain pertinent. They serve
not only to underline the limitations of these current proposals but also

to establish guidelines for creating a new court that avoids the
problems associated with an adjunct Supreme Court.
1. Prestigeand Position of the National Court

The Freund Committee's proposed court was criticized as provid-

ing work too mundane to attract the highest quality judges. 98 The allure of the National Court, in both prestige and the intrinsic interest of

its work, must be great enough to attract good judges. This is particularly important in view of the sensitive position of the National Court:

it will render decisions of national impact, but it must do so in conformance with the philosophy and pronouncements of the Supreme
Court. Thus the National Court will be required to walk a narrow path
between national leadership and the deference required of a lower
court. 99 This task will demand skilled jurists.
96. In recognition of the virtually unanimous criticism of transfer jurisdiction, Senate
Bill 1529, which would have established a National Court of Appeals similar to the one
proposed by the Hruska Commission, omitted transfer jurisdiction. S 1529, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S8750-51 (daily ed. July 29, 1981); for the text of S1529, see Court
Reform Legilation,HearingsBefore the Subcomr, on Courts ofthe Senate JudiciaryComm.,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-13 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Court Reform Hearings].
97. The term "adjunct" is normally used to designate courts that hear cases on referral
from federal district court. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 78-79 (1982). Most often these are the courts of the United States Magistrates.
The analogy with the Freund and Hruska courts is not strict, since in most cases the adjunct
courts do not enter their own orders but simply arrive at recommended dispositions that are
approved or modified by the district judge. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 68182 (1980). Nevertheless use of the referral mechanism and the increased scrutiny the
Supreme Court will accord National Court decisions makes the analogy useful.
98. See Haworth, supra note 90, at 858. This criticism is legitimate only to the extent
the Supreme Court chooses not to refer cases to the National Court for decision. Screening
petitions alone would no doubt be dreary work, but if screening was interspersed with deciding cases of national importance, one would think that the work would be of intrinsic interest at least equal to that of a typical court of appeals.
99. Commentators have debated whether a National Court can walk this line and still
avoid the constitutional proscription against more than one Supreme Court. CompareNote,
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The very sensitivity of this task, however, points out a further restraint on the National Court's status. The Hruska Commission's proposed court was criticized as lowering the prestige of the circuit courts
and detracting from the unique status of the Supreme Court, making
judgeships on both courts less desirable and lessening the authority of
the Supreme Court's pronouncements.c ° Thus, any new National
Court of Appeals must accommodate two conflicting institutional restraints: it must have adequate prestige to attract fine jurists yet keep a
relatively low profile so as not to impair the prestige of either the circuit
courts or the Supreme Court. The Freund Committee court supposedly fell afoul of the first restraint; the Hruska Commission court supposedly fell afoul of the latter.
2. Relations With the Supreme Court

Although both proposed courts were invented to ease the Supreme
Court's workload, it was not obvious that they would produce that result. As was pointed out above, the screening task assigned to the
Freund Committee court-reducing the number of petitions from
thousands to hundreds-is not the most time consuming aspect of
screening certiorari petitions. Further, the type of reference jurisdiction envisioned for both courts would likely entangle the Supreme
Court in significantly more administrative work. As a practical matter,
when exercising reference jurisdiction not only will the Supreme Court
be required to review each certiorari petition and decide whether to
grant or deny it, but it will also have to decide whether to refer the
petition to the National Court and, if so, whether to make a hearing
mandatory or discretionary. This would not be particularly burdensome as long as the Supreme Court trusted the judgment of the National Court; but if an ideological split developed between the courts,
decisions about referral would be problematic. In addition the
CongressionalPrerogatives,the Constitution, and a National Court of Appeals, 5 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 715 (1978) andNote, The NationalCourt fAppeals: A Qualfed Concurrence,
62 GEO. L.J. 881 (1974) (both finding it constitutional) with Gressman, The Constitution v.
The Freund Report, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 951 (1973) and Note, The National Court of
Appeals: A Constitutional "Inferior Court?" 72 MICH. L. REV. 290 (1973) (both finding it
unconstitutional).
Careful structuring of the relations of the two courts should avoid this problem, and is
considered briefly infra note 159.
100. See Owens, supra note 5, at 602; Court Reform Hearings, supra note 96, at 123-24
(Statement of Jonathan Rose); Feinberg, supra note 20, at 108; Swygert, The ProposedNational Court ofAppeals: A Threat to JudicialSymmetry, 51 IND. L.J. 327, 331 (1976); Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law andthe Logistics
of DirectReview, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1063 (1977).
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Supreme Court will face certiorari petitions from parties to cases referred to and heard by the National Court. 10' This second review
might well be more time consuming than a normal certiorari decision
since denial of the petition would allow a nationally binding precedent
to stand. t0 2 Denial of these petitions would come much closer to implicit approval of the decision below than denial of petitions from
courts of limited geographic jurisdiction. Aggravating this increase in
work would be an increased flood of initial certiorari petitions since the
possibility of higher court review would be effectively doubled.'0 3
Thus the Supreme Court would be required to decrease its plenary
docket in order to handle the increased administrative burden,
although this decrease would theoretically be more than compensated
for by the added capacity of the National Court.
A potentially more serious problem is maintaining effective
Supreme Court supervision of the National Court without damaging
the new court's prestige. As envisioned by both plans, the National
Court would work very much like an adjunct to the Supreme Court.
Yet it would be staffed by proud and independent federal judges. Because the Supreme Court's review of National Court decisions would
be oriented toward error detection, it would likely reverse most cases
that it accepts for review, hurting the lower court's prestige.'0 4 A difference in philosophy between the two courts will only intensify this problem and increase tensions within the Supreme Court by making the
decisions to refer or review more difficult.' 0 5 Further, the appearance of
an internecine squabble will damage the authority of both courts' decisions. Knowing this, the Supreme Court is unlikely to entrust sensitive
decisions to the National Court. Even if it is not later required to reverse the National Court, the Supreme Court will have to subject such
decisions to careful and time consuming review.' 06 The likely result of
these delicate institutional relations would be specialization; the
Supreme Court would retain cases presenting issues of individual rights
and federalism while referring those cases presenting questions of statutory interpretation and procedure.' 7 Such specialization may be in101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See Feinberg, supra note 20, at 107.
See id at 108; Alsup, supra note 41, at 443-46.
Alsup, supra note 41, at 450-51.
Feinberg, supra note 20, at 108.
Owens, supranote 5, at 604.
Alsup, supra note 41, at 443-44.
Hellman, supranote 56, at 1799-1801.
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trinsically undesirable. 10 8 At the least, it will create difficulties in
harmonizing Supreme Court and National Court decisions in those
rare situations when the Supreme Court is compelled to review cases
within the National Court's putative sphere. 0 9
These increased administrative burdens on the Supreme Court are
a probable result of reference jurisdiction. Although the problems of
meshing the views of the two courts are less apt to become serious because National Court judges will be constrained by institutional loyalty, they remain a potential threat. In any case, these considerations
illustrate the sensitive problems of institutional relations that proposals
for a new court must confront.
3. Structure of the National Court
Some of the problems mentioned above can be eased by careful
structuring of the National Court. For example, recent proponents of
the National Court emphasize the creation of a court of reduced stature
so as to minimize the intrusion of the new court upon the Supreme
Court's prestige.I" Although the Hruska Commission's proposed court
consisted of permanent judges, the recent consensus seems to be that
the Freund Committee's original proposal-to select the National
Court's judges on a rotating basis from among sitting Circuit Judges
and to give them a finite term-is preferable. II This would insure that
experienced judges would serve on the new court but reduce the possibility of long-term ideological differences with the Supreme Court. It
also would provide some flexibility for handling variable caseloads.
Terms that are too short must also be avoided, however, since they
carry the threat of counter-productive institutional instability." 2
Many have decried the creation of any fourth tier of judicial review because of the added uncertainty, expense and delay it would
bring to litigation. Reference jurisdiction could exacerbate the problem of delay if the Supreme Court adopts a broad policy of referral
108. As discussed by Professor Helman, the Court's decisionmaking in cases containing
individual rights and federalism issues might suffer without continued exposure to the more
structured issues presented outside constitutional law. Id
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Levin, supranote 10, at 19; Cutler, supranote 86, at 23. This solution must
not be carried too far, for the National Court must retain enough prestige to attract superior
jurists. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
111. See Levin, supra note 10, at 16-21; Cutler, supra note 86, at 23; Lay, supra note 23, at
179; Court Reform Hearings, supra note 96, at 40 (remarks of Judge Hufstedler).
112. Haworth, supra note 90, at 858.
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with hearing at the National Court's discretion. ' 3 This fourth tier,
however, may be the price for an increase in national appellate capac' 4
ity necessary to keep Supreme Court review universally available.
In addition, out of the thousands of litigants who petition for Supreme
Court review, only a few hundred would suffer the delay created by
further National Court reviews. Nevertheless, every effort should be
made to avoid expanding either the size or complexity of appellate review in redesigning the judiciary.
B. The Interim National En Banc Court
Chief Justice Burger recently proposed the creation of a "National

En Banc Court""' 5 as an emergency interim measure for easing the
Supreme Court's workload. '

6

This court would be created immedi-

ately and serve only for the next five years, during which time a national study commission would be enlisted to formulate a permanent
solution.' The Chief Justice's proposal has quickly attracted the attention of Congress" 8 and has prompted public expressions of support
from Justices O'Connor,"19 Rehnquist, 20 and Powell. 2 ' It has also
been embodied in Senate legislation. 22 Particularly because it is
designed to be temporary, this proposal seems far more likely to be
113. Feinberg, supra note 20, at 107. See also Lay, supra note 23, at 174; Wechsler, supra
note 100, at 1063.
114. There are other ways to mitigate the problems created by four tiers of courts. One
would be to pay the expenses of litigants whose cases are granted Supreme Court review.
Thus delay, while naturally frustrating, would not be economically burdensome. This
would have the further advantage of underlining the important role of such cases in establishing national law.
115. The phrase is from Wallace, supra note 41, at 936, but it accurately encapsulates the
court proposed by the Chief Justice.
116. Burger Feb. 1983 Speech, supra note 4, at 447.
117. See id Legislation to create the commission has already been introduced by Alabama Senator Howell Heflin as S.381, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S892 (daily ed.
Feb. 2, 1983).
118. Four CircuitChiefJudgesDiffer in CongressionalTestimony on ProposedIntercircuit
Tribunal,15 THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1983, at 3.
119. Justice O'Connor Backs Plan to Ease High Court's Burden, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16,
1983, § I, at 8, col. 4 (W. ed.).
120. Rehnquist Supports Burger on Panelto Reduce Overload,N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1983,
§ 1, at 10, col. 4 (W. ed.).
121. Powell 1983 Speech, supranote 27. Justice Stevens has expressed opposition to the
plan. See Greenhouse, New Appeals Court Opposed by Stevens at a House Hearing, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 11, 1983, § 1, at col. 1.
122. S.645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S1947 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983). In the
bill, the proposed court is referred to as the Intercircuit Tribunal of the United States Courts
of Appeals; in this Article the court will be referred to as the Intercircuit Tribunal. It differs
somewhat from the Chief Justice's proposal, and these differences are noted where
appropriate.

482

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 11:457

adopted than any previous one. Should it be adopted and prove successful in its short-term role, there inevitably will be pressures either to
make it permanent

23

or to use it as a model for a permanent court.

Thus, it is important to analyze its potential as a long-term remedy and
point out what long-term predictions can reasonably be made from its
performance during its initial term.
The design for the National En Banc Court avoids the most objectionable features of the courts proposed by the Freund Committee and

Hruska Commission. As envisioned by the Chief Justice, the court
would consist of thirteen current Circuit Judges, one from each circuit,
designated to sit in panels of nine for a term of six months to one
year. 2 4 Its jurisdiction would be limited to cases presenting a conflict

between circuits and, perhaps, limited questions of statutory interpretation.' 25 The Chief Justice has not stated precisely how he envisions
these cases would be selected, but from his statement that the Supreme

Court's plenary docket would thereby be relieved of thirty-five to fifty
cases per Term, 1 26 it may be inferred that these cases would be referred
to the new court from among those selected for hearing by the Supreme
Court.27 Of course, certiorari would still lie from the new court to the
128
Supreme Court.
29
The En Banc Court is well designed as a temporary solution.'
123. Judge Wallace, in fact, has proposed a court very similar to the Chief Justice's as a
permanent solution. See Wallace, supra note 41, at 936.
124. Burger May 1983 Speech, supra note 13, at 5. As originally proposed, the National
En Banc Court was to consist of 26 circuit judges, 2 from each circuit, sitting in 7 to 9 judge
panels. See Burger Feb. 1983 Speech, supra note 4, at 447. The court would be organized
administratively as an arm of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit so as to take
advantage of that court's existing facilities.
125. Burger Feb. 1983 Speech, supra note 4, at 447.
126. Id
127. The Intercircuit Tribunal would hear cases solely on referral from the Supreme
Court. S. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1259(a), 129 CONG. REC. S1956 (daily ed. Mar. 1,
1983).
128. Id Judge Wallace's permanent alternative, described in Wallace, supra note 41, at
936-40, is similar. His proposed court would be assembled from among sitting circuit judges
to resolve intercircuit conflicts referred by the Supreme Court. Rather than establish a continuously available tribunal, however, he proposes that national en bane hearings be triggered by a vote of the Supreme Court or a group of 12 circuit judges on a case-by-case basis.
Once triggered, 12 judges would be chosen randomly from the circuit courts and assembled
to hear that one case. Subsequent conflicts would be heard by different, freshly assembled
panels of 12. This procedure is intentionally designed to be cumbersome in order to discourage its use. Judge Wallace's en banc court would only resolve "unacceptable" conflicts;
"acceptable" ones presumably would be resolved by the Supreme Court or left standing.
129. The major objection to the proposed National En Banc Court is that a workable
temporary solution may, by relieving the immediate need for a permanent solution, prevent
more comprehensive reform. For this reason, the Chief Justice's proposal should not be
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Because it contemplates no large-scale change in the structure of the
judiciary, it can be enacted quickly-and dissolved-without disturbing established institutional relations. As long as the new court
hears only conflict cases that the Supreme Court would otherwise de-

cide itself, it is initially unlikely to create much new administrative
work for the Court, t30 and it will relieve the Court of a significant
chunk of the plenary docket. Although the En Banc Court does create a
fourth tier of review, it does so in as innocuous a manner as possible.
Because it would not be deciding emotionally charged issues, the Jus-

tices would not feel compelled to give its decisions uniquely careful
review. Further, because it would not consist of permanent judges,
there would be less risk of a long-term ideological split with the
Supreme Court; hence reversals by the High Court would not damage

its prestige. Its presumably part-time nature and limited role assures it
would not detract from the prestige of either the Supreme Court or the

courts of appeals.' 3 '
Because the Chief Justice's proposed court is likely to be successful
as a short-term solution, the tendency will be to convert it into the per-

manent solution. Unfortunately, those aspects of the En Banc Court
which make it attractive as a short-term solution by minimizing its disturbance of existing institutional relations would weaken its effectiveness over the long-term. In part this depends upon how the court is
used. The Chief Justice and Judge Wallace envision it as deciding pri-

marily cases presenting an intercircuit conflict, but legislation before
adopted unless accompanied by a study commission. Undoubtedly, awareness of this principle led the Chief Justice to propose the two together.
130. It will presumably add somewhat to the certiorari docket. Litigants who are discouraged from taking their cases to the High Court by the small chance of being granted a
hearing will be encouraged by the presence of the second court to petition for certiorari.
The number of discouraged appellants is difficult to estimate.
131. Of the two proposals, the Chief Justice's seems likely to be more effective. The
concept underlying Judge Wallace's cumbersome assembly mechanism is logically flawed,
since it insures that triggering his court will require as much work as having the Supreme
Court decide a case itself. His notion of an "unacceptable" conflict is anomalous in this
context. Apparently, it refers to cases that present serious conflicts but which the Supreme
Court has no time to decide. Do conflicts exist which are "acceptable" enough that the
Supreme Court does not feel compelled to decide them, yet which are so "unacceptable"
that it can justify calling 12 busy circuit judges to Washington to hear them? There is no
inherent reason why conflict resolution should be so cumbersome. Although Judge Wallace
justifies it as a means to limit the procedure's use, see Wallace, supranote 41, at 937, it would
be preferable to trust the discretion of the Justices to limit the number of cases referred to
the National En Banc Court. It is unlikely they will refer frivolous conflicts simply to keep
the new court busy. The Chief Justice's proposal is more sound; by establishing a rotating
court that is ready to hear cases referred to it, the use of the system will be promoted rather
than discouraged. This will provide maximum relief of the Supreme Court's workload.
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the Senate would give the court jurisdiction over any case referred to it
by the Supreme Court.132 This would include federal cases not
presenting a conflict and, if constitutional, cases from state courts. In
other words, the court's role would be determined by the Supreme
Court.
If the En Banc Court's caseload is restricted mostly to cases
presenting conflicts-cases which, for the most part, the Supreme Court
would have decided itself in the absence of a new court-it will do
nothing toward solving the High Court's failure to provide adequate
guidance to the lower courts.'3 3 While it may ease the Justices' burden
significantly, it will do little to improve the performance of the federal
appellate system as a whole. Unresolved issues would continue to proliferate in the absence of a clear decisional framework, engendering
uncertainty and expense and multiplying caseloads in the lower
34
courts.'
If, on the other hand, the Supreme Court chooses to exercise the
full power given the En Banc Court through the referral mechanism in
the Senate legislation, it would become a much more flexible and useful tool. However, it would also be indistinguishable from a Hruska
Commission-type adjunct Supreme Court and therefore would run into
the same problems of intrusiveness. 35 Expanding the court's role to
this degree would create a far different court from that envisioned by
the Chief Justice.
The short terms of the appointed judges and the large number of
judges would also create problems in the long-run. The En Banc Court
132. S. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1271(a), 129 CONG. REC. S1947 (daily ed. Mar. 1,
1983). The court's decisions apparently would be binding on state and federal courts. S.
645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1271(b), 129 CONG. REc. S1947 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983).
133. At best, such an En Banc Court can help the Supreme Court in two ways: first, by
easing the pressure on the plenary docket, giving the Justices more time for care and reflection in writing their opinions; and second, by not only deciding conflict cases which the
Court would otherwise have decided, but also by deciding conflict cases the High Court
would not have had time to address.
There is a third way that the En Banc Court may help. If the Justices fill up the approximately 30 openings in the plenary docket with new cases they would not otherwise have
decided, the total appellate capacity at the highest level will be increased. No doubt this will
happen to some extent. There will be a strong temptation for the Court to decide as many
cases as it did before the creation of the En Banc Court rather than to decide fewer cases and
give each one more careful attention. This is not, however, the pattern the Chief Justice
envisions, nor would it necessarily be wise.
134. The Chief Justice did suggest "perhaps" giving the court broader power over some
questions of statutory interpretation. Burger Feb. 1983 Speech, supra note 4, at 447. This
would expand the usefulness of the court to some degree. It would also increase significantly
the administrative burdens on the Supreme Court.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 93, 100-09, 113.
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is specifically crafted not to resemble a traditional court-that is, a permanent and stable body of individuals creating and developing legal
doctrine-but rather a collection of "task forces." It would gather together a random group for a short period of time to study and resolve a
few narrow problems. As a result, the court would produce weak
precedents. While this can be a useful feature in an interim court, assuring minimal intrusion into the development of doctrine in the individual circuits, it is a weakness in a permanent arrangement.
The first factor contributing to this weakness is the court's ambiguous authority. Although its cases would presumably present narrow
issues of law, by judicial discretion they could become vehicles for
broad statements of judicial policy. En Banc judges who view the
proper role of the court as resolving conflicts as narrowly and delicately
as possible would eschew such statements. Those with a more expansive view would not. This is likely to lead to conflict not only within the
En Banc Court but also within the lower courts that must apply the En
Banc decisions. Lower court judges who view the En Banc Court's role
as a narrow one would correspondingly construe its decisions narrowly,
disregarding broader statements of policy as dictum. Judges who disagree with the court's pronouncements would be tempted to do the
same, regardless of their views on the proper scope of its authority.
Thus, the court's precedents would neither be applied uniformly, nor
be assured of more than a very narrow reading.
Second, the authority of the court's precedents would be further
weakened by its inability to guarantee consistent or stable doctrinal development. Because the court would consist of a continually changing
spectrum ofjudges, there is no guarantee that those judges who attempt
to establish particular doctrine would be around to decide key subsequent cases, and judges deciding the later cases may not be like
minded. 36 This effect would be compounded by the nature of the questions the court confronts. Conflict cases by definition represent close
questions on which reasonable judges can reach opposite conclusions.
Since random selection is equally likely to produce a majority ofjudges
136. To a lesser degree this is also the situation in the largest circuit courts, where two
panels within a circuit may not agree. There are two very significant differences, however,
between the circuit courts and the En Banc Court in this respect. First, circuit judges must
work closely together at all times. This restrains attempts to undercut each other's precedents and may even create a limited camaraderie that encourages doctrinal consistency.
Second, the circuit courts are able to enforce consistent doctrinal development by hearing en
banc those cases that engender intracircuit conflict. The threat of an en banc hearing both
discourages differences and provides a prompt way to settle them. The proposed En Banc
Court must rely instead on the overburdened Supreme Court to settle such problems.

486

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 11:457

for either side,13 7 there is no guarantee that the course of doctrine
would be steadied by consistency in the beliefs of the participating
judges. The only constraints on doctrinal development would be the
rather weak ones provided by past decisions which can be manipulated
by judges hostile to their direction. 138 Further, en banc decisions will
have less inherent authority because of their partially fortuitous
character. 139
Finally, the precedents of the En Banc Court would be weakened
because it would have no efficient way to enforce the doctrine pronounced. Normal appellate courts are able to supervise the enforcement of their decisions through later appellate review. Enforcement of
the En Banc Court's decisions, however, will depend upon two factors
beyond the court's control: 1)primary enforcement will be in the hands
of the circuit courts, and 2) the Supreme Court may not refer a case to
it involving a conflict between a circuit court and the En Banc Court.14
In addition, even assuming the Supreme Court refers the case to the En
Banc Court, the panel that decides this case may not hold the same
137. This is one inevitable result of a Court with a frequently rotating bench, and it has
important implications for the intrinsic authority of the court's pronouncements. The ultimate result will not appear to have grown out of a long line of established doctrine; rather it
will seem to be randomly arrived at by the vagaries of the selection process. The lower
courts' perception of this fortuitous element cannot help but weaken the authority of the En
Banc Court's decisions.
138. It is impossible to predict exactly how judges in such a court would react to this
situation. In circuit courts, adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis can be enforced by
resort to an en bane hearing. See Note, supra note 12, at 1641; Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). The
threat of an en bane hearing, combined with the judges' sense of institutional duty, helps
achieve consistent and predictable legal interpretation. There would be no opportunity for
an en bane hearing to assure uniformity or consistency of National En Banc Court decisions.
See supra note 136. Institutional duty, therefore, might as readily cause each en bane judge
to rely on his or her own sense of justice in reaching a "right" result as to adhere to stare
decisis. This would be true particularly if the prior decision's results, if not its reasoning, can
be harmonized with the decision at hand. The result might well be a precedent that is useful
only for resolving narrow questions of law and nearly useless to future litigants.
139. Because of this element of randomness, split decisions by the En Banc Court would
seriously erode the moral force of its opinions. Split decisions will only accentuate the accidental quality of the ultimate holding and cast shadows on other National En Banc Court
decisions. This fortuity will tend to exonerate circuit court panels which loosely apply National En Banc Court precedent.
140. The means of enforcement of En Banc Court decisions-that is, of assuring they are
followed in letter and spirit by the lower courts--is not discussed by either Wallace or Burger. Three methods are conceivable. First, the Supreme Court might handle the duty on
certiorari. This is realistic for the first few years, but, as discussed below, it would eventually
become a chore. The second method is the alternative envisioned in the text: permitting the
Supreme Court to refer these challenges to the En Banc Court. A third alternative is that the
circuits be entrusted with the job of insuring that their members obey the En Banc Court
through en bane hearings in the individual courts of appeals.
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views as the panel that rendered the previous En Banc Court decision
and thus may read the prior precedent as narrowly or broadly as it
likes. This potential for looseness in the enforcement of En Banc Court
decisions would create several deleterious effects: 1) hostile lower
judges would feel free to manipulate the En Banc Court decisions; 2)
litigants would be encouraged to challenge them, creating even more
litigation; and 3) whatever guiding role the En Banc Court had would
be undercut.
For several reasons, these structural flaws would not emerge during the first few years of the interim court's existence. Thus, its performance during that time would not necessarily be an accurate
indicator of its long-term prospects. First, the likelihood of a more intrusive and less universally acceptable alternative should the En Banc
Court fail would encourage federal judges to cooperate with the court
during its early years. Members of the court would suppress differences among themselves, and other judges would suppress their disagreement with its pronouncements. The knowledge that the court is not
necessarily permanent would also encourage short-term cooperation.
The burden imposed by the new court on the Supreme Court
would also be lighter during its first years. The High Court might exercise less painstaking scrutiny over the decisions of a possibly temporary
court than it would over the decisions of a court creating the foundations of lasting doctrine. Even if this were not the case, the burden of
enforcing En Banc Court decisions plainly will be lighter initially, since
there will be few decisions to enforce. Only after several years will the
dimensions of the problem of enforcement become clear. 141 For these
reasons, smooth interim functioning of the En Banc Court cannot be
taken as a guarantee of effective permanent operation.
IV.

Two Proposals to Improve the Effectiveness of the
Federal Appellate System

It is apparent that change in the present structure of the federal
appellate system is necessary if the courts are to deal effectively with
their enormous caseloads. It is also apparent that present proposals do
not provide the necessary structural changes. Two proposals will be
141. This is a major weakness of the En Banc Court: like the proposed Freund and
Hruska courts, it relies on the Supreme Court either to enforce its decisions or to refer cases
to it which concern enforcement. Because of the susceptibility to challenge of the En Banc
Court decisions, the number of petitions for enforcement might well be large. This burden
would develop slowly and may not be noticed during the early years, but it could become
significant.
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presented here that attempt to address the problems facing the federal
appellate courts. First, structural changes within the present circuit
court system are suggested. Second, a different National Circuit Court
will be proposed and examined.
A. Structural Change in the Circuit Courts of Appeal
This Article has indicated that the workload of the Supreme Court
is intimately related to the workload and structure of the courts of ap-

peals. The burden of supervising the relatively cumbersome structure
of thirteen independent lower appellate courts is substantial. The large
number of separate circuits not only increases the likelihood that con-

flict will arise but requires that, in the absence of clearly guiding
Supreme Court authority, an issue be litigated up to thirteen times
before it is firmly settled. Reducing the number of circuits would presumably lighten the Supreme Court's burden, for it would lessen the
adverse consequences of the current level of reduced supervision. 4 2
Unfortunately, as discussed above, the tremendous caseload of the
courts of appeals has caused an increased number of circuits. The addition of new judges needed to cope with an expanding docket increases the size of the courts to the point at which coordinated judicial
decisionmaking is no longer possible, and fission is the only solution.
For example, the old Fifth Circuit became too large and split, and the
Ninth Circuit has grown nearly as large. Perhaps only the Ninth Circuit's success in adopting a partial en banc rule' 4 3 and the difficulty
encountered in devising a scheme for reconstituting it as separate
courts have saved it from being split. Although membership in other
circuit courts of appeals could nearly double from their present size
before any single circuit reached the Ninth Circuit's current size,' 4 it is
142. This also is a course advocated by Judge Wallace, supra note 41, at 940.
143. This rule permits the Chief Judge and 10 other randomly selected active Circuit
Judges to sit en banc in lieu of the whole court of 23. 9TH CIR. R. 25.
144. This capacity for growth may be in part illusory. Individual judges of the circuit
courts are already heavily overworked. In 1981, individual workloads exceeded those that
precipitated the dramatic expansion in size brought by the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-21. If the circuit courts were expanded so as to lower
the judges' caseloads to a more manageable size, the remaining room for expansion would
be significantly diminished. For example, 40 more judges would have been needed in 1981
to reduce the number of cases filed per judge that year to the average workload of 1979,
when the number of federal judges was greatly increased. See 1981 REPORT, supra note 7, at
185. Adding 40 judges would have been an expansion of 30%. Id. If the rate of growth in
1982 was the same as that in 1981, 64 judges were needed to achieve the 1979 caseload
level-a 48% expansion. If the federal appellate caseload continues to grow at the 1981 rate
through 1985, the circuit courts will have to double in size to maintain their caseloads at the
1979 level. Even to maintain the current, concededly excessive, caseloads, the circuit courts
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clear that current pressures are splitting the circuits rather than fusing
them. The experience of the old Fifth Circuit further demonstrates that
fusing the circuits will be self-defeating without additional structural
change permitting the efficient operation of a large court. The resulting
behemoths will create more problems for the courts of appeals 145 than
they will solve for the Supreme Court.
If the circuits are to be consolidated, they must be internally restructured in a way which permits efficient operation. One of the first
modern studies of the workload problem in the courts of appeals, by a
committee of the American Bar Foundation, 46 suggested such a restructuring plan. The plan has suffered neglect, perhaps because it was
too far ahead of its time, and deserves renewed consideration. The
plan called for a substantial reduction in the number of circuits
through consolidation. 47 In order to prevent the problem of intracircuit conflicts and to assure uniformity of interpretation within the
larger circuits 48 without using ungainly en banc procedures,149 the
will have to double in size by 1987 if the 1981 rate of caseload growth continues. Therefore,
the scenario proposed-doubling the courts until all reach a size at which fission will be
necessary-will be obsolete in far less than a decade.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
146. American Bar Foundation, Accommodating the Workload of the United States
Courts of Appeals: Report of Recommendations 5 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Foundation
Report]. This report was written by a Project Advisory Committee to the American Bar
Foundation which was convened in 1968 to examine methods of easing what was already
viewed as a very heavy caseload burden on the circuit courts. The Project Director was Paul
D. Carrington; Committee members were Bernard G. Segal, Chairman; Lindsey Cowen,
Charles S. Desmond, Nathan B. Goodnow, Leon Jaworski, David W. Louisell, Thurgood
Marshall, Carl McGowan, and Paul J. Mishkin.
147. Foundation Report, supranote 146, at 6.
148. Conffict is a likely result of expansion into larger circuits for the following reasons.
First, adding more judges will result in more divergent points of view in written opinions.
Second, the larger number of decisions will make it increasingly difficult for judges to keep
abreast of the decisions of their brethren. A third source of conffict must also be considered.
A study of three circuit courts found that one major force limiting dissent-and presumably
intracircuit conflict as well-is time pressure. The judges are so busy that "go along to get
along" becomes the byword. HowARD, supra note 20, at 205-09. Any plan that eased workloads would be likely to increase conflict by making expression of dissent easier.
149. A study found that courts would go to great lengths to avoid meeting en banc.
HOWARD, supra note 20, at 216-17. Not only are en banc hearings time consuming and
difficult to schedule, see Carrington, Crowded.Dockets andthe CourtsofAppeals: The Threat
to the Function oReview and the NationalLaw, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542, 582-83 (1969); Note,
supranote 12, at 1642-45, but they tend to create factions and spoil court harmony. HowARD, supra note 20, at 205-07, 216-17.
Even a partial en banc approach, such as that used by the Ninth Circuit, is problematic.
For example, not all judges are allowed to participate in the decision. Although this did not
deter the Ninth Circuit from adopting the approach, it did prevent it in the old Fifth Circuit.
Baker, supra note 14, at 702-03. Also the partial en banc procedure suffers from the same
problems as the full en banc hearing; they are simply visited upon fewer judges. Presuma-
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committee proposed to divide each circuit into "subject matter" subdivisions. The divisions would be much smaller than the full court. Consequently each division could keep order within its subject matter

specialties much more effectively and efficiently than the full circuit.
This proposed system would subdivide each circuit into divisions
of approximately seven members each. 150 Each division would be re-

sponsible for a defined range of subject matter of cases, and subject
matter assignments would be divided so as to burden each division
equally. 15 Disputes over which division should hear a case could be

determined administratively by reference to an arbitrary hierarchy of
subject matters,' 52 but there would be no right to a hearing in any particular division. Because lines between divisions would not be jurisdictional, each division would retain the full power of the court of
appeals. 153
In order to avoid the parochialism of specialization, judges would
be transferred between divisions every three or four years. In this way,
each circuit judge could maintain the breadth of view of the generalist.154 Each division would consider all issues in a case; however, each
would also defer to the judgment of the others in areas outside its own

expertise. The pronouncements of a division in an area of law outside
bly, as a court grows and intracircuit conflicts become more numerous, the total burden on
the court will once again become prohibitive.
150. This could, for example, consist of six circuit judges and a divisional chief judge.
Divisions could be expanded beyond seven members to absorb additional judges if court
size later increases.
151. Statistics are kept on the type and number of cases filed in the circuit courts. See,
e.g., 1981 REPORT, supra note 7, at 188. Thus, achieving an equal workload would be relatively simple. Carrington makes such a sample assignment. Carrington, supra note 149, at
589, 594. In any case, if a particular division became overburdened, divisional lines could
easily be redrawn.
152. For example, a case containing a labor issue would be automatically assigned to the
first division. A case containing an antitrust issue would be assigned to the second divisionunless it also contained a labor issue.
153. Thus, if necessary, any division could hear any case. Also, if a division to which a
case had been assigned believed the case would benefit from treatment by another division,
it could order the case transferred.
154. Other factors would also work against specialization. The range of questions which
confront circuit judges is so large that grouping them into even four or five categories will
not significantly narrow the diversity within categories. It will only screen out particular
types of cases. As Carrington pointed out, this proposal might even diminish the impact of
"expertism" on federal law. Carrington, supra note 149, at 591. As currently constituted, the
courts of appeals funnel such a bewildering array of complex issues to their judges it tempts
them to rely on the experts among them in certain areas. By partially reducing this vast
array of issues, the divisions could enable each judge to come to a more complete understanding of each area, reducing the need to rely on experts. In addition, there is no reason
why a judge who wished to handle a more varied range of cases could not sit on more than
one division.
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its purview would not bind the circuit as a whole.1 55 Therefore, seven
judges would ordinarily have sole responsibility for making the law in
any subject matter area. This small number would permit rapid communication of recent decisions and simple resolutions of disputes
through en banc procedures.
Besides reducing the Supreme Court's burden, this system could
also readily accommodate the inevitable expansion of the courts of appeals. As more judges were needed, they could be distributed among
the divisions until enough judges had been added to make up a new
division. At that time divisional lines could be redrawn and the new
division established. At least five divisions could be readily
56
accommodated.1
This divisional scheme gives the circuit courts the advantages of
specialization while escaping its disadvantages.' 57 It provides a means
for the courts of appeals to expand without increasing either the
number of circuits or the number of intracircuit conflicts. As the large
caseload of the courts of appeals expands further, this will become a
substantial advantage. Also, this plan is likely to reduce substantially
the Supreme Court's task of supervision, thus relieving the pressure exerted by its caseload. The Committee's proposal may seem somewhat
complex, but simpler solutions are unlikely to be effective. The prob155. The "law of the circuit" rule, discussed infra note 191, has not been granted statutory or constitutional status. There is no explicit requirement that the pronouncements of
one panel of a circuit court bind the others. Indeed, some judges have refused to follow the
rule. See, e.g., North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1978) (one panel can reconsider another panel's ruling
under "novel and special circumstances"); Speigner v. Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.4 (6th
Cir. 1979), ceri. denied,444 U.S. 1076 (1980) (panel adopted new test for criminal responsibility). There is no apparent obstacle to giving "law of the circuit" effect to some rulings and
not to others.
Furthermore, if one division found an important issue in a case which was not within its
"subject matter" nor clearly covered by precedent, it could transfer the case to another division for resolution of the issue. According to one scholar, only about 10% of circuit cases are
not covered by precedent. HOWARD, supra note 20, at 165. Most of these cases would be
routed to their proper division--especially if divisional lines were sensitively drawn--so that
few cases would require transfer.
156. At some point, of course, subject matter would not accommodate further subdivision, but this would probably not occur until at least five divisions of seven judges each were
created. See Carrington, supra note 149, at 590. Indeed, the number could be much larger
than this. At the point of maximum subdivision, the size of divisions could expand at least
to nine without serious problems--in other words, to a court size of a minimum of 45. Only
then might further structural change be necessary.
157. The scheme is not without some potential problems or objections, however, and
these are addressed by Carrington, supra note 149, at 591-96. No problem is so insuperable
that it precludes effective use of the plan.
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lem has simply grown too great to be accommodated by solutions
which do not invoke substantial structural change.
B. The National Circuit Court: An Alternative Proposal

The preceding discussion is not meant to denigrate a new national
court as a solution to workload problems, but a successful court would
require a more complete restructuring of the appellate system. The primary reason that the National En Banc Court envisioned by Judge
Wallace and Chief Justice Burger fails as a long-term solution' 5 8 is that
it addresses only a symptom of the larger problem: that no issue is
settled nationally unless it has been ruled on either by thirteen circuit
courts or by the Supreme Court. This situation encourages pointlessly
repetitive litigation in the lower courts because the Supreme Court
lacks the decisional capacity to provide a framework to settle most such
issues. The resulting conffict, and potential for conflict, ruins predictability, breeds litigation, and encourages forum shopping and government nonacquiescence.
What is needed is a method, short of Supreme Court review, that
provides early and binding settlement of issues that frequently arise in
federal litigation.' 59 Such a court is proposed below. Its structure is
guided by two aims: first, to address directly the problem of unresolved
issues, and second, to constitute the new court as an arm of the courts
of appeals rather than the Supreme Court. In this way, the burden of
guiding and supervising the courts of appeals can be wholly removed
from the shoulders of the Supreme Court, leaving it free to select and
decide cases solely on the basis of their intrinsic importance. The basic
structure of the court is described below, followed by a discussion of
158. The Chief Justice intended his court as only an interim solution. See supra text
accompanying notes 116-23. In this role it is likely to be successful.
159. Federal issue litigation occurs, of course, in both state and federal courts. This Article addresses primarily the problems associated with federal court litigation, although the
new court could also be used to bring uniformity to state court interpretation of federal law.
There are considerable problems associated with Supreme Court review of state decisions.
See Stolz, FederalReview of State Court Decisionsof FederalQuestions: The Needfor AdditionalAppellate Capacity,64 CALIF. L. REv. 943 (1976). Because of federalism and constitutional constraints, it is difficult to conceive of a way to solve the problem of inadequate
federal appellate capacity for review of state court decisions without limiting the jurisdiction
of a new court to cases referred to it by the Supreme Court, as proposed by the Hruska
Commission. State high court justices are unlikely to agree readily to review of their decisions by a court of less authority than the Supreme Court. Even if the new court could avoid
the proscription against multiple Supreme Courts, there is a further constitutional problem.
Current circuit judges may not be able to review state court decisions because their senatorial confirmation was premised on their reviewing only federal court cases. Therefore, new
judges might have to be chosen and confirmed for this type of adjunct court.
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the operation and significance of its jurisdiction, its place in the federal
appellate scheme, and its advantages over previously proposed new
courts.
Because the court will act like an en banc panel for the entire circuit court system, it should be structured to simulate a National En
Banc Court. An actual National En Banc Court would, of course, be

impractical; rather, a few circuit judges must sit as representatives of
their brethren. The judges must be experienced-perhaps a minimum
60
of five years in the circuit courts-and chosen in a random manner'

that guarantees some geographic diversity.' 6' The court could sit in
panels of seven; initially, it need have no more members than this. 62
The terms of the judges must be fixed and lengthy, perhaps five to

seven years. The terms should also be staggered so that ultimately
there will be only one or two appointments per year. 163 This will assure

a continuity of judicial philosophy and help avoid the possibility of
long-term divergence of views from the Supreme Court feared by critics of the Hruska Commission's proposed court.
The court would operate as a circuit court; it could be named the

National Circuit.' 64 Jurisdiction would be over cases on direct appeal
from the district courts, rather than from decisions of other circuit
courts, as most other proposals have recommended. Unlike other cir160. The legitimacy of this court must derive in part from its status as representative of
the individual circuit courts. This objective would be accomplished most directly if the
judges were selected by the circuit judges themselves. However, this system would very
likely lead to an injection of an undesirable element of politics into the selection process.
Although appointment by the President or Chief Justice is another possibility, these, too,
create the potential for politicization. Random selection combined with a requirement of a
minimum level of experience would result in a competent and impartial court whose composition was insulated from political manipulation. All judges who wish to withdraw themselves from consideration should, of course, be allowed to do so.
161. Geographic diversity is not necessary, but it would assure that random selection
resulted in a minimum floor of representativeness. As long as the court consisted of fewer
than 12 judges, assuming the judges of the federal circuit remained outside this system, the
circuits could be grouped geographically with one judge drawn randomly from each of
seven groupings. For example, six judges could be drawn from the following groups of
roughly equal size: D.C. and 4th, Ist, 2d and 3d, 5th and 1 th, 6th and 7th, 8th and 10th, and
9th. The Chief Judge could be chosen at random from among the 12 Chief Judges.
162. A court with seven members will be large enough to command respect, but not so
large as to threaten serious splintering of decisions. The size of the court's docket will be
difficult to predict. If it is or becomes too great for seven judges, the size of the court can be
readily expanded by selecting more members to sit in panels of seven.
163. Workload will determine whether the members can continue as judges in their
home circuits, whether they meet only periodically as a national court, or whether they must
devote themselves full-time to the new court's duties.
164. The phrase is from a 1968 report that applied it to a court designed solely to resolve
intercircuit conflicts. See Foundation Report, supra note 146, at 7.
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cuit courts, however, it would not have automatic jurisdiction over appeals from particular district courts. Instead, it would hear appeals
only on petition of either party from any district court16 5 on grounds
that the case contained a substantial issue of federal law which had
66
previously been decided in published opinions in two other circuits.1
If the National Circuit Court found the case to be within its jurisdiction, it would be obliged to decide it, but its determination of whether it
had jurisdiction would be nonr~viewable. 6 7 Additionally, the court
could accept appeals by certiorari from any circuit court decision on
the grounds that the decision conflicted with a prior ruling of the National Circuit Court. 68 All National Circuit decisions would be binding on all other circuit and district courts. 169 Review of its decisions
would lie via certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The critical feature of the court is the scope of its jurisdiction. Its
aim is to assure that no issue that frequently arises in the lower federal
courts will remain unresolved on a national level for an extended period. 7' Because of the scope of its jurisdiction, the National Circuit
can give national guidance in a wide range of matters. At the same
time, the requirement that the issue be raised in two other circuits besides the circuit from which appeal is taken' 7' places very important
165. In practice, litigants would file an appeal in the circuit with jurisdiction over their
district. They could then file a petition with the National Circuit Court, and if it was
granted, the case would be transferred to that court. Since there is no guarantee that one of
the litigants will petition the National Circuit Court, it would be desirable to permit the
members of the circuit court in which the appeal is initially filed also to transfer the case.
For example, if a majority of the circuit judges chosen to hear the appeal believed the case
fell within the jurisdiction of the National Circuit, they could transfer it on their own motion. In either situation the National Circuit would have the final say in deciding whether
the case actually did fall within its jurisdiction.
166. These could be the decisions of either three-judge panels or en banc courts.
167. If the case was not within its jurisdiction, the petition would be denied; appeal
would lie through the normal appellate channels.
168. This jurisdiction would permit the court to enforce its decisions. Through this mechanism, it could assure that its decisions would be followed by the other circuit courts. Nor
would it be dependent, as the other proposed en banc courts would be, on the Supreme
Court or en banc assemblies of the circuit courts to enforce adherence to its decisions.
169. The National Circuit could at its discretion decide either the specific unresolved
issue on which its jurisdiction was based or all issues in the case. If it chose not to decide all
issues, the remaining issues would be transferred back to the "home" circuit for decision. If
it did choose to decide the other nonjurisdictionally-based issues, their resolution would not
be binding on other circuit courts.
170. Some of these issues would, of course, be issues which have produced conflicts.
Thus, the court will not only be able to resolve intercircuit conflicts, but it will also be able to
resolve issues that have arisen in three circuits but have not yet produced a conflict.
171. This requirement excludes issues which may arise frequently within one or two circuits and thus be decided by more than one panel within a single circuit. These issues might
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limits on the National Circuit's jurisdiction. First, it assures that the

National Circuit will address only issues of national scope. Three circuits are one-quarter of the federal appellate system. Issues that are
geographically confined to one or two circuits will never reach the National Circuit and can continue to develop within their respective circuits. 1 72 Second, it assures that the National Circuit cannot act

prematurely. Every issue it addresses will have been addressed previously by at least three district judges and two panels of three circuit
judges each. Although the passage of the amount of time necessary for
three cases to be decided may not always be sufficient for adequate
"percolation" of a provocative issue prior to Supreme Court treatment,
it would nearly always be sufficient to allow the National Circuit to
supply provisional uniformity. 173 The costs of delaying national resolution-in terms of uncertainty and increased litigation-would almost
certainly exceed the benefits of further percolation in these circumstances.' 74 Third, jurisdictional constraints prevent the court from
overreaching. Its jurisdiction is well defined, preventing it from hearing any questions except those which arise sufficiently frequently. In
addition, the jurisdiction is mandatory. Unlike the Supreme Court, the
National Circuit has no power to choose its cases once it decides they
are within its jurisdiction.
At the heart of this design is a new view of the proper role of the
Supreme Court in the federal appellate system.' 75 The Court would be
well be truly local or regional, and would best be left to the expertise of the judges of the
particular circuit or circuits in which they arise.
172. Some areas of law may be relevant in only three or four circuits. In these circumstances, the National Circuit could choose to defer to the expertise of those circuits by adopting one of their decisions as its own. It cannot be denied, however, that an area of law which
reaches one-fourth to one-third of the circuits is in need of the harmonizing treatment the
National Circuit could provide.
173. Of course, if an issue was urgent, the Supreme Court would have two opportunities
to address it before it reached the National Circuit. The National Circuit would act only in
the absence of Supreme Court action.
174. Nor would National Circuit treatment of an issue necessarily force Supreme Court
treatment. Because the National Circuit would be entirely a creature of the circuit courts, its
pronouncements would not have the same authority that other proposed national courts'
decisions would have. It would not exercise reference jurisdiction and would not look like a
Supreme Court adjunct; therefore, the Supreme Court would not feel compelled to scrutinize its decisions. Rather, the Supreme Court could watch the impact of the National Circuit's ruling and review the issue when presented on certiorari at some future time if it felt
the ruling's effect was unsatisfactory. In other words, the National Circuit could supply a
proving ground for national resolution without drawing on the authority or "political capital" of the Supreme Court.
175. A change in the role and duties of the Supreme Court and its Justices is hardly
unprecendented. On the contrary, the Court's duties have been redefined several times in
the past as a by-product of efforts to ease its workload. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
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relieved of its current duty to assure uniform interpretation of federal
law in the lower courts 76 by resolving conflicts; the circuit courts
would be given a powerful tool to supervise themselves. This would
free the Supreme Court to select and review cases solely on the basis of
their intrinsic importance, and yet allow it to intervene to redirect the
course of lower court interpretation whenever it found this necessary.
It would never be required, however, to intervene simply to restore
order. 177
The National Circuit Court would ease the Supreme Court's
workload in several ways. First, it would remove from the Court's plenary docket those cases which it accepts solely to resolve intercircuit
conflicts. It is likely that the Court reviews many of these cases not
because they are of exceptional intrinsic importance or of a highly sensitive nature but solely because a uniform national rule is needed. The
National Circuit Court would free the Court of this burden. The Chief
Justice estimates this would involve at least thirty-five cases. 7 Additionally, the Supreme Court could decide to entrust interpretation of
many statutes to the National Circuit Court. As discussed earlier, the
Court has already handed over the bulk of statutory interpretation to
the courts of appeals; it could now complete this process in good
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 32-41 (2d ed. 1973). The initial six Justices of the Supreme Court, by sitting in

pairs with a district judge while riding circuit, constituted the entire federal appellate system.
Id at 32-36. During the 19th Century, both the Court's size and federal jurisdiction were
slowly expanded while circuit riding duties were eased, but the Justices were not relieved
entirely of first-tier appellate chores until 1891. Id. at 36-40. Although review by certiorari
was also introduced in 1891, most appeals to the Court were by right until 1925, when the
current system was adopted. Id at 41. Thus the Court has evolved from serving as an entire
appellate system to the highly selective, elite appellate tier which exists today. The Court's
role cannot be fixed, for in an expanding society any role will inevitably outrun the fixed
capacities of nine individuals.
176. An exception must be made here for circuit court decisions that conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court. In that case the Supreme Court will remain the only court with
jurisdiction.
177. It must be noted that this suggested role is very close to the role the Court fills today
and is similar to the role the Court would play if its conflict resolving duties were delegated
to an En Banc Court or Intercircuit Tribunal. The National Circuit Court is designed in
part to resolve conflicts, a role for which the Supreme Court now has little time. It is not
intended to displace the jurisdiction of the Court over such cases. The instant plan is selfexecuting, unlike previous proposals. It would relieve the Supreme Court of the need to
refer cases.
178. Burger Feb. 1983 Speech, supranote 4, at 447. The certiorari docket would be similarly relieved of cases for which the only ground for Supreme Court review was intercircuit
conflict. Of course, the true number of intercircuit conflicts is likely much greater than the
number stated in the text. See supra notes 34-40.
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conscience. 1
Equally important, the performance of duties now assigned to the
Supreme Court would improve greatly. There would be a method for
insuring that all conflicts of legal interpretation among circuits are resolved' 80 and nationally unresolved issues would find timely and uniform resolution. A National Circuit Court would be able to provide
guidance in many areas the Court is forced to neglect. This would provide additional national coherence in federal law and also greater pre-

dictability and certainty. Presumably, by lightening the Supreme
Court's load, the National Circuit would also permit the High Court to
give more thorough treatment to the questions of overriding national
importance it reviews. Finally, instead of forcing premature consideration of national issues upon the Supreme Court, the National Circuit
would permit the Court to delay consideration of such issues as long as
it felt necessary.' 8 ' That is, because the National Circuit would not be
a branch of the Supreme Court, its decisions would not demand more
179. The Supreme Court also has the job of assuring that federal constitutional and statutory law are uniformly applied in the state courts. The National Circuit Court is not
designed to share this burden directly. Indeed, it might not be able to do so constitutionally.
See supra note 159. However, the National Circuit Court could provide guidance to state
courts faced with federal issues. This would not assure uniformity since the decisions would
not bind the states, but it would provide willing state court judges with a means to achieve
uniformity. The National Circuit's jurisdiction also could be expanded to allow it to review
federal cases presenting issues raised previously in two published state court decisions reviewable by the Supreme Court. This would widen its jurisdiction from issues arising in the
circuit courts to include those in "the highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had," 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982). Although this would not allow direct review of state court
decisions, it would allow review of federal cases which conflicted with prior state decisions.
This may constitute a significant proportion of the cases brought to the Supreme Court on
grounds of a conflict. See, e.g., Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). These two areas of judicial expansion
would at least ease the burden on the Supreme Court, if not provide direct relief.
180. The current scheme proposes that conflicts will not be resolved until the issue arises
again in a third circuit. See supra note 17 1. This unhurried resolution recognizes that conflicts are not inherently evil, as Judge Wallace pointed out, and thus do not demand immediate resolution. If, however, experience and future studies show that some conflicts do
demand immediate treatment, the jurisdiction of the National Circuit Court could be expanded to permit discretionary review of a circuit court decision on the ground that it directly conflicts with a previous circuit court decision. Although immediate treatment would
still be presumptively unnecessary, the National Circuit judges would be empowered to decide whether it was warranted in that instance. If review was denied by the National Circuit
and conflict was maintained as a ground in a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court,
the Court would then have the benefit of the National Circuit's opinion regarding the existence and importance of the conflict. Presumably it would rarely review decisions in alleged
conflict cases that the National Circuit viewed as not urgent.
181. The Court would remain free to intervene in urgent issues, see supra note 173, since
no issue would reach the National Circuit without two prior opportunities for certiorari.
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immediate review than those of other circuits. 182 On the contrary, because the National Circuit would provide a national answer to national
issues, it would allow the Supreme Court to delay consideration with-

out risking legal chaos among the lower courts.

83

The new role of the Supreme Court envisioned by this proposal
retains the Court's most important traditional functions. 84 The Court
will continue to have the final word on important issues of federal stat-

utory and constitutional law, to control the balance of power between
federal and state governments and among the different branches of the
federal government, to limit official encroachment on civil rights, and
to define crucial language in federal statutes. In addition, it will have
the ability to review every case it now selects for review; the difference

is that it will no longer be pressured to hear cases of little intrinsic
importance in pursuance of its supervisory role. These cases will be
delegated to the National Circuit Court.

It may be argued that this is likely to lead to specialization of the
Supreme Court in constitutional and civil rights issues, but there is no
necessary reason why this should happen.' 8 5 The Court has already

moved toward such specialization, and it may be that its role as our
only national court now demands this shift. The National Circuit will
182. See infra note 195.
183. Additionally, the National Circuit Court could draw some of the political heat from
the Supreme Court by making provisional decisions on hard national issues, allowing the
Court to intervene later when initial emotions have cooled. This process might, in fact,
speed the resolution of such issues.
Also, it can be argued that the proposed system will lead to better statutory interpretation simply because the National Circuit Court will consist of judges who deal with federal
statutes more frequently than Supreme Court Justices do. Because the judges will be drawn
from different circuits, they will have the opportunity to harmonize the different approaches
to statutory interpretation used by their respective individual circuits. Not only will this
produce statutory decisions based upon a familiarity with the statutes that the Supreme
Court Justices simply may not have, but also the decisions win combine the best aspects of
existing statutory analysis from the individual circuits while intruding no more than is necessary upon the analyses used by the individual circuits.
184. The question here is not whether this role change is desirable. Because the Court
simply does not have time to fill its current role, see supra text accompanying notes 16-81,
some change is necessary. The relevant question is thus: what change in the Court's role
will shed burdensome duties while leaving intact those functions uniquely suited to the nation's highest court? It is against this inquiry that any new court must be measured.
185. Specialization, generally thought to be undesirable, see supra note 108, is not uniformly rejected. See, e.g., Nelson, Court Can Solve Docket Problem by Itself, LEGAL TiMEs,
Oct. 25, 1982, at 8, col. 2. Nelson proposes that the Court should drastically reduce its
consideration of statutory issues, concentrating instead on constitutional and civil rights
issues.
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ease this trend.' 86 Even assuming, arguendo, that the Court is not
forced by its national duties to specialize, the addition of the National

Circuit will not cause any further specialization. The Supreme Court
will remain free to review as many statutory issues as it does now, but it
will review those issues because they are crucial, not because they for-

tuitously produced a conflict. Therefore, any specialization which does
occur will arise from the Justices' decision that effective performance of

their duties demands it. If the Justices are forced to specialize, it is
undoubtedly preferable that the federal appellate system be redesigned
to accommodate this rather than left helpless to cope with it.
Analysis of the National Circuit Court shows that it will ease the
Court's workload more effectively and less objectionably than earlier
proposals. The seven member panel size will be large enough to avoid
the difficulties of reaching consensus which accompany a larger

panel.' 87 By rotating the judges through the court at a rate of one to
two per year,'88 the National Circuit will avoid acquiring a well defined
and persistent ideological bent. Yet by changing the membership

slowly, continuity will be preserved.
slowly and without abruptness, and
formed by a similar and presumably
ity. This will lessen the problem of
proposed en banc schemes.18 9

Changes in orientation will occur,
all decisions close in time will be
more predictable judicial sensibilunpredictability inherent in other

186. The present trend is toward specialization. See supra text accompanying notes 5680. The National Circuit Court is designed to permit the federal appellate system to cope
effectively with changes forced upon it.
187. The mechanics of the court's operations need not be firmly set. At the outset there is
no reason why the National Circuit judges cannot continue to sit part-time in their home
circuits, meeting for oral hearings and conferences when necessary in Washington at the
Federal Circuit's headquarters, as the Chief Justice has suggested for his National En Banc
Court. Burger Feb. 1983 Speech, supra note 4, at 447. Continuous personal contact between
the judges is not necessary for drafting mutually acceptable opinions because of modem
electronic communication. Even if National Circuit Court duties become a full-time job for
the judges of that court, occasional meetings in Washington and electronic communications
might still be satisfactory. However, a permanent, central headquarters for the National
Circuit Court will probably be needed for maximum efficiency. Thus, it is likely that the
court will eventually need to find a permanent home.
188. If more than seven judges are needed to keep up with the court's workload, two
judges would need to be chosen in occasional years; this will also be the case if the judges'
terms are set at five, rather than seven, years.
189. Although judges for the National Circuit will be chosen randomly within geographic limits, this random selection will not cause the same decision-to-decision variation
that would occur with other proposed courts whose members would be chosen much more
frequently. Instead, the effects of its rotating membership will be felt only in cycles of five to
seven years. Consequently, there will be less temptation to abrogate earlier court decisions,
since participants in those decisions may still be members of the court.
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The designation of this court as an independent circuit court made
up of circuit judges is important for two reasons. First, it emphasizes
the importance of the court's work and assures that its members will
have equal status with circuit judges. 190 Yet it also suggests that these
judges, who come from and will return to the other circuits, are supervising themselves rather than acting as part of a "higher" court.' 91 This
latter point is an essential distinction between the National Circuit and

the Freund and Hruska proposals. Both the Freund Committee's and
Hruska Commission's proposed courts were criticized for their close

ties to the Supreme Court. Although this structure gave them the advantage of sharing most directly the Court's burden, it led to several

potential problems. The "little Supreme Court" would clearly detract
from the prestige of the circuit judges and could also threaten the prestige and legitimacy of the Supreme Court if there were sharp and re-

peated disagreements between the two. 192 By exercising only reference
jurisdiction, the new courts could also threaten to add to the Supreme
Court's administrative burden. 93 Those courts also inserted a fourth

tier of review. The National Circuit Court avoids all these potential
190. This is in distinction to an intercircuit panel, as suggested by Levin, supranote 10, at
16-21, and Cutler, supranote 86, at 23. Although the effect of both courts may be the same,
designating the court as a circuit court will lend authority to its decisions and accord it the
prestige it deserves.
191. This concept, however, raises the question of whether the decisions of a court of
ostensibly coordinate authority are binding on its sister courts. This is not the situation
existing in the courts of appeals today. Most circuit courts have adopted the law-of-thecircuit rule, under which a decision of one panel within a circuit court binds other panels of
that court until the precedent is altered by an en banc hearing. A similar approach is taken
in state court appellate systems. One commentator has suggested that the intermediate appellate courts in California take a different approach and are bound by panels in different
appellate districts. Note, Securing Uniformity in National Law:. A ProposalforNational
Stare Decisis in the Courtsof Appeals, 87 YALE L.J. 1219, 1236-37 (1978). Although this is
correct in theory, in practice the approach of these courts is essentially identical to that of the
courts of appeals. See 6 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 667, at 4580 (2d ed. 1971);

Theresa Enter., Inc. v. Davis, 81 Cal. App. 3d 940, 947, 146 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1978), overruled
on othergrounds,32 Cal. 3d 563, 564-65, 186 Cal. Rptr. 494, 500-01 (Supp. 1982); Chambers
v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 33 Cal. App. 3d 923,928, 109 Cal. Rptr. 413,416-17 (1973).
At the same time, nothing prevents such a rule. See generally Note, supra. The Constitution gives Congress virtually complete control over the structure of the lower federal
courts. The source of the prevailing rule in the courts of appeals is not clear, but it is not
from an act of Congress. Moore refered to it as "common knowledge." 1B J. MOORE, W.
TAGGERT & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,

0.402[1], at 63 (1965). This long

standing practice apparently derived from the circuits' application of common law rules of
stare decisis to their view of themselves as separate courts rather than branches of a unitary
court of appeals. There is nothing sacred-or constitutional-about this view; Congress is
free to create a circuit court that would bind other circuit courts.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
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problems. It clearly would not decrease circuit judge prestige, for its
members would be picked randomly from the circuits and would have

equal status with other circuit judges. 194 More importantly, it would
not threaten the Supreme Court. First, because it is a circuit court, it
would not share the High Court's prestige. Thus, disagreements between the two courts would not have the same internecine quality. In

addition, the High Court's refusal to review a National Circuit decision
would not create as strong a suggestion of affirmance as would a refusal

to review a decision of one of the other proposed courts. Instead, such a
denial would have the neutral quality associated with current circuit
court certiorari denials because 1) the appeal would be from a circuit
court, and 2) the appeal would not
be after referral to the National
195
Circuit from the Supreme Court.
Second, the National Circuit would be completely self-administering. Therefore, it would not tie up the Supreme Court's time. By absorbing some cases that would otherwise 1inflate
the Court's certiorari
96

docket, it would lighten the Court's load.

194. Also, unlike other proposed national courts, the National Circuit will only rarely
review circuit court opinions.
195. It is true that the Court would be permitting to stand a decision of national effect.
To that extent, a refusal to review a National Circuit decision will undeniably be more
important than a refusal to review a typical circuit court decision. The difference lies in the
National Circuit's character as a supervisory circuit court rather than a supplement to the
Supreme Court. A refusal to review its decisions would appear less likely to be an affirmance of its views as would a refusal to review the decision of a plainly "adjunct" court. This
difference is in the appearancerather than in the practical effect of the decisions.
196. Other proposed national courts do have one advantage not shared by the National
Circuit: they can directly share the Supreme Court's burden by hearing cases it otherwise
would hear. This is the crucial difference between the National Circuit and the National
Court of Appeals. The National Court of Appeals would lessen the workload of the
Supreme Court by doing part of its work; the National Circuit would ease the Court's workload by redefining its role and hearing the cases no longer required to be heard by the
Supreme Court.
The latter approach seems less appealing because it is less direct. Perhaps to that extent
it would be less effective. However, the direct approach taken by other proposals carries
very significant costs in terms of increased administrative burdens, decreased prestige, and
other institutional problems. See supra notes 134-39, 188-94 and accompanying text. The
Supreme Court is simply not an institution which will comfortably accommodate an adjunct.
Further, there are limits to the types of cases the National Court of Appeals is likely to
decide. Review of state supreme court decisions by the National Court of Appeals, even if it
passes constitutional muster, raises sensitive questions of federal-state relations. As a result,
the workload of the National Court of Appeals is likely to be composed primarily of the
same types of cases the National Circuit Court would decide. Thus the National Circuit
Court would in effect handle the same caseload as the proposed National Court of Appeals,
but it would do so without Supreme Court involvement. For this reason, the indirect approach inherent in the design and structure of the National Circuit Court is one of its primary virtues.
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For both these reasons, the National Circuit design is preferable to
those courts proposed earlier. Additionally, although in limited circumstances the National Circuit would be a fourth tier of review, in
most cases it would add little or no additional time and expense to
federal litigation.
A lack of guidance in national law is the greatest failing of the
Supreme Court. This lack of guidance manifests itself through issues
which arise frequently but have no clear national answer. The jurisdiction of the National Circuit Court is designed to handle just these issues. Nevertheless, two objections may be raised. First, there is no
direct connection between providing guidance and resolving issues that
are frequently raised but nationally unresolved. Some method of certiorari might be preferable; this would permit the National Circuit to
choose its cases so as to provide the most effective guidance. The latter
course must be rejected, however, because it turns the National Circuit
into a "little Supreme Court." The jurisdiction proposed in the text
will permit guidance-admittedly less efficiently than certiorari-while
limiting intervention by the National Circuit to those occasions when
the courts of appeals objectively demonstrate that intervention is
needed. The role of the National Circuit is intentionally restricted to
prevent the evils of uncertainty and forum shopping without riding
herd over the circuits. The circuit courts will continue to have as much
freedom as is consistent with efficient and uniform legal interpretation.
The second objection which can be leveled at the proposed National Circuit's jurisdiction is that it is defined somewhat arbitrarily. In
part this cannot be refuted. In order to make the National Circuit's
jurisdiction clear and circumscribed, some line has to be drawn, and
such lines are inherently somewhat arbitrary. However, the line is only
partially arbitrary. It assures that an issue will be raised in three circuits-a quarter of the total-before being finally settled. This assures
that nine federal judges will pass on it before it reaches the National
Circuit, thus wringing the benefits of "percolation" from the issue
1 97
before experimentation ends.
Additionally, the line is not entirely inflexible. Whether to accept
hearing will ultimately be at the National Circuit judges' discretion,
and it is likely that variations in the presentation of an issue in prior
197. It is impossible to determine at what point the benefits of experimentation generally
begin to outweigh the costs of uncertainty. There is simply no data on this subject. Onefourth of the circuits is merely a suggestion. If experience should prove that one-third of the
circuits is preferable, the jurisdiction could be changed. Alternatively, one-fourth could be
set as a threshold, and the decision to wait for further percolation could be placed at the
discretion of the National Circuit judges.
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circuits will justify the judges' denial of hearing, thus permitting further
percolation of the difficult issue. In other words, although there is a
strong presumption that the National Circuit Court will hear a case
presenting an issue that has arisen in three circuits, inherent difficulties
of defining an "identical issue" will provide the flexibility needed to
deny hearing when this is the wisest course.
In summary, the proposed National Circuit Court is carefully tailored to solve the basic problems confronting the federal appellate system while avoiding the new problems that would accompany an
adjunct Supreme Court. As an element of the circuit courts of appeals,
the National Circuit would bring some certainty and uniformity to federal law without threatening the power and legitimacy of the Supreme
Court or wasting the Court's time by requiring additional administration. Indeed, it gives the lower federal courts the capacity for self-administration while leaving intact the circuit court structure. The
jurisdiction of the National Circuit is essential to limit and define the
role of the court and keep it from interfering unduly with the operations of either the Supreme Court or other circuit courts. Further, the
jurisdiction is sufficiently flexible and can be easily changed if experience proves this advisable.
Conclusion
The workloads and structures of the Supreme Court and the courts
of appeals are intimately related. The tremendous growth of federal
litigation, even when filtered through the relatively cumbersome structure of the courts of appeals, has overwhelmed the Supreme Court,
forcing it to reduce dramatically its supervision of the lower appellate
courts. This in turn has increased litigation in the lower courts, primarily because of the slower resolution of legal issues at the national level.
Attempts to solve this problem by creating an adjunct Supreme
Court are likely to be unsuccessful. The administrative burdens such a
court would place on the Supreme Court and the substantial problems
in adjusting the institutional relations of the two courts are likely to
outweigh the value of the second court. Also, the modest additional
appellate capacity provided by an adjunct court is unlikely to improve
appreciably the supervision of the lower courts. A court designed
solely to resolve intercircuit conflicts would operate much more
smoothly, but it, too, would not provide adequate guidance for lower
courts.

The better solution lies either in altering the structure of the courts
of appeals so as to simplify supervision or in removing the burden of
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this task from the Supreme Court altogether. This would enable the
Supreme Court to concentrate on addressing intrinsically important issues of national law. There may be many ways of accomplishing these
results, and creative solutions must be encouraged. This Article has
proposed two solutions for the problems facing federal appellate courts,
but does not purport to be the final word on the question. The inquiry
into the proper form of such substantial and far reaching change can
only be a beginning.

